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The common law, in the absence of applicable filing or recording statutes, recognizes the interest of a conditional seller as a
claim superior to that of purchasers, encumbrancers, or creditors
claiming under or through the conditional buyer.' Such a result
follows naturally as an application of the pervasive common law
notion that no one can transfer to another a greater interest in
property than the transferor himself possesses. The tendency of
such a rule, however, is to subject persons dealing with conditional
buyers, on the faith of apparent ownership, to hidden hazards, and
incidentally to circumvent in a measure the chattel mortgage recording acts. It is, therefore, not surprising that, with the widening
employment of conditional sales contracts, legislatures and courts
have exerted themselves to correct this situation by conditioning
the preservation of the conditional seller's superiority of position
as against designated classes of claimants upon compliance with
the terms of filing or recording acts, until today such a requirement
exists in something over thirty states of the Union. 2 In West Virginia, there has been such a statute since the first decade of statehood.8 The state having adopted, in common with nine others,4
the provisions of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,5 there have
accordingly been some changes in detail from the terms and proAssociate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1 WmILLIsTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) 750; Newcomb v. Guthrie, 145 Va.
627, 134 S. H. 585 (1926).
2 See the somewhat variant lists in 1 WmLLISTON, SAMS § 327, and 2 U-4rFoRu
LAws ANxOTATED (1922) 6, 7. The latter work also notes that in Kentucky the
courts have construed the chattel mortgage recording act as applicable to con1 See

ditional sales.

3 See W. Va. Acts 1872-3, c. 106.
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visions of the initial statute, but without alteration of the basic
principle that full refention of the conditional seller's contract
rights depends upon his filing the contract of record in the manner
prescribed by statute.
Conceivably the statutes might go either to the one extreme
of requiring the filing or recording to take place concurrently with
the formation of the contract, or to the other of permitting the conditional seller to record at any time in the indefinite future and
obtain the full advantage of cutting off both intermediate and subsequent claims. The latter alternative would obviously emasculate
the recording acts altogether and has nowhere been adopted. The
former is, in fact, the construction which has been placed on
statutes that fix no time for filing, in so far as subsequently accruing claims of third persons are concerned 7 a construction well
illustrated by Huffard v. Akers," applying the West Virginia
statute which preceded the adoption of the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act. Independently of that Act, this is apparently the more
usual type of statutory provision although some states have indicated a specified time within which the contract shall be filed9
With a view to alleviating the harshness incident to the requirement
of virtually instantaneous registration, ° this device of designating
a specific period for filing has been incorporated into the Uniform
Act, which names the ten days after the making of the sale11 or
4Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, and Wisconsin.

GSee W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) §§ 4007-4038. The Uniform Act was
adopted in 1921.
6 The distinctions between the acts requiring filing and those requiring recording have no relevance to the subject 6f the present discussion, and accordingly
the expressions will be used interchangeably hereafter in the paper.
73 JoNEs, CHATEL MORTGAGES & CONmrIONA. SALES (6th ed. 1933) § 1070.
8 52 W. Va. 21, 43 S. E. 124 (1902). The contract was recorded the thirteenth day after execution. The third party claim was a landlord's lien based
on an existing contract for rental of the premises where the goods were delivered, and was deemed to have attached from the time of delivery although thero
was no change of position by the landlord prior to the recording of the contract.
9 The statutes are reprinted in 2 UWuron LAws ANNOTATEm 43-244. A summary of their terms in the particular referred to may be found in 3 Jo-Es, op.
cit. supra n. 7, § 1067. The Connecticut statute, GEN. STAT. REvisION 1930, §
4697, is unique in specifying a filing "within a reasonable time".
10 The reason for the choice is stated in the Commissioners' Notes, 2 UNIFORu
LAws ANNoTATm 9, as follows: "It was thought unwise to require the seller
to file immediately. The seller's office may be far distant from the filing district. He should have a reasonable time to mail his papers and get them filed."
11 Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 5, W. VA. CODE (Miche, 1937) § 4011.
In Alask,, the period has been extended to 60 days; in Indiana, the section is
omitted; in New York, the clause of the section requiring filing in ten days is
omitted.
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after removal into another filing district," and the thirty days next
preceding the expiration of the term of years for which the
original filing is good,', as the respective times foi filing and obtaining the benefit of the act24
The fixing of a stated period after the transaction as the time
for filing, while it renders the requirement practical and efficacious,
yet presents special issues which could not otherwise arise. At least
four situations may be distinguished. If the conditional seller files
the contract within the time allowed, and thereafter third persons
acquire claims as purchasers or creditors, the act by its clear tenor
protects the seller's perfected claim. Conversely, if the time has
been allowed to go by without filing, and then the adverse claims
arise before the conditional seller acts under the statute to preserve
his security, the third persons who have acquired assertable rights
will prevail. But there are two intermediate situations. What if
the interests of the third persons originate within the period allowed
for filing but before there has been an actual filing? Or what if
the conditional seller, having suffered the statutory time for filing
to lapse without action, actually files the contract at a later time
before the opposing claims have come into existence? These cases
are not so clearly covered by the terms of the statutes. The purpose
of the present discussion is to~explore and criticize the authorities
bearing on them, and especially those which involve the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act.
The problem is one with respect to the interrelation between
protected interests and time-the relative status of the seller's interest under the contract and of claims adverse to the contract, and
the time allotted by statute for filing the agreement. Sound
analysis and appraisal of the cases in which they have arisen in
combination rests upon an understanding of each of these components independently. Full exploration of their ramifications is
12 Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 14, W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) § 4020.
In Indiana the section is omitted. By the West Virginia statute, oupra,-the
"tcounty" is speeifically mentioned in place of a generdl r-efer~nce -the Ifil-

ing district".
i Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 11, W.

VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) § 4017.
The original filing is good under the Uniform Act for three years, under the
West Virginia modification for five years.
14 There are special provisions with respect to the filing of conditional sales
contracts affecting fixtures, Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 7, W. VA. CoDn
(Mchie, 1937) § 4013, railroad and water carrier equipment, Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 8, W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) § 4014, and goods sold for
resale, Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 9, W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) § 4015.
This discussion will be confined to other goods not falling in those special
categories.
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not here possible. *A brief resume of their more conspicuous features is presented, however, as a useful background for a consideration of the narrower subject.
Some efficacy the conditional seller's retention of title has,
from the moment of sale, regardless of when or whether the contract is filed.' 5 There are persons and kinds of claims that do not
come within the purview of the recording acts;"' as to them, the
seller's remissness in filing late or not at all is not available and
they stand subject to his title as at common law. The statutory
scheme has been characterized as designed only for the protection
of purchasers from and creditors of the conditional buyer and as
having no bearing when the rights of no such parties are in issue.2
Whatever may be its accuracy and occasional helpfulness, this
formula probably gives less information than does a categorical
examination of the kinds of claims to which the seller's unfiled
or defectively filed title has been held immune. Dependent upon
legislation as the whole modification of the conditional seller's
position is, the list naturally varies between jurisdictions as their
several statutes vary; yet there is measurable agreement in many
particulars.
It is uniformly held, regardless of the form of the particular
statute involved, that, as between the parties to the transaction,
conditional buyer and conditional seller, nothing depends upon the
seller's compliance with the provisions of the act, the retained title
being as effectual before or without filing as after a timely proper
record. 1'8 So, too, third persons claiming from or under the buyer,
U The contract, aside from its title-retaining features, and in so far as it
involves only the seller's position as a general creditor claiming the unpaid
installments of the purchase price, is of course unaffected by the statutes and
is valid in the same way as any other contract of sale on credit. This is shown
not only by the many cases involving distribution of an insolvent buyer's estate, where the seller unsuccessfully claiming security is ranked with other
general creditors, but also by the fact that this personal liability of the buyer
to the seller has rarely, if ever, been disputed because of the latter's failure to
Ble. As a contract, the agreement is good and enforceable from its inception.
1 Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 4, W. V.. Cowr (Michie, 1987) § 4010,
is declaratory of this principle.
-rIn re B & B Motor Sales Corp., 277 Fed. 808 (Dist. X. J. 1922) (Uniform
Act, controversy between the assignee, and the trustee in bankruptcy, of a conditional seller); Harris v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 190 W. C. 480, 130 S. E. 319
(1925) (suit by seller who had duly Aled against tortfeasor who paid buyer
judgment for damages and asserted such payment as a release not barred by

the record).
'isThis has been held under the Uniform Act, Depew v. C. W. Depew & Co.,
98 N. J. Eq. 461, 131 AtL 76 (1925); Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust
Co., 259 N. Y. 343,182 N. E. 10 (1932); see Auto Sales Co. v. Yost, 91 W. Va.
493, 113 S. E. 758 (1922), and, under other statutes of varying types, Kennison
v. International Clay Machinery Co., 13 F. (2d) 774 (C. C.A. 6th, 1926) (Ohio
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whether as purchasers, encumbrancers, or creditors, are subject in
any event to the paramount seller's security title where they take
with actual notice of the existence of the contract19 or without
having given consideration. 20 Unless the claim asserted arose in
good faith without notice for value it must yield to the contractual
arrangement.
Except as the claim adversely asserted is one possessed by an
innocent third person who acted unaw are of the conditional sale,
the seller need never have any fears concerning his title whatever
the facts or the law as to filing; but within that exception may
arise a motley variety of claims urged by purchasers, creditors,
encumbrancers, and lienholders, who have nothing in common
except their nonparticipation in the original transaction and their
lack of acquaintance with its existence; and the really difficult
problem is to determine which among them are, in at least some
contingencies, potential beneficiaries of the recording acts. That
depends on the terms of the applicable statute and the way the
statute); Gill v. Kahl-Holt Co., 47 App. D. C. 53 (1917); Wyatt v. Duncan,
149 Kan. 244, 87 P. (2d) 233 (1939); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Mayberry, 195 S. E. 508, 142 S. E. 767 (1928) ; Doyle v. Yoho Hooker Youngstown Co., 130 Ohio St. 400, 200 N. E. 123 (1936) ; New Jersey Fidelity & Plate
Glass Ins. Co. v. General Electric Co., 160 Va. 342, 168 S. E. 425 (1933); .1.
Bernstein & Sons v. Allen, 127 Wash. 314, 220 Pac. 801 (1923). It has 'pven
been held, where the conditional buyer reacquired the property from a bona
fide purchaser at execution sale, whose own title would have been protected and
who could therefore in general have conferred title on others having notice or
giving no consideration, that such conditional buyer must yield to the conditional seller's title, being estopped to deny it because it was his duty to have
prevented it from being divested. Maryland Credit Finance Corp. v. Campbell,
8 W. W. Harr. 575, 195 Atl. 277 (Del. 1937) (decision under Uniform Act).
For a collection of the authorities see 55 C. J. 1244.
19 Gordon v. Loer, 57 Idaho 269, 65 P. (2d) 148 (1937); Thomas Roberts.&
Co. v. Robinson, 141 Md. 37, 118 Atl. 198 (1922); Holt Motor Co. v. R. C. A.
Photophone, Inc., 196 Minn. 527, 265 N. W. 313 (1936) ; American Box Machine
Co. v. Zentgraf, 45 App. Div. 522, 61 N. Y. Supp. 417 (1899); Biederman v.
Edson & Co., Inc., 128 Misc. 455, 219 N. Y. Supp. 115 (1926) (under Uniform
Act); Gibson Oil Co. v. Hayes Equipment Mfg. Co., 163 Okla. 134, 21 P. (2d)
17 (1933); Moneyweight Scale Co. v. Hale-Halsell Grocery Co., 57 Okla. 135,
156 Pac. 1187 (1916); Riccardi Motor Cars, Inc. v. Weinstein, 98 Pa. Super.
41 (1929) (under Uniform Act); New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass Ins. Co.
v. General Electric Co., 160 Va. 342, 168 S. E. 425 (1933) ; Brown v. Woody, 9a
W. Va. 512, 127 S. E. 325 (1925) (under Uniform Act); Casper Motor Co. v.
Marquis, 31 Wyo. 115, 223 Pac. 764 (1924) ; see Goudie v. American Moore Peg
Co., 81 N. H. 88, 122 At. 349 (1923) (seller's title enforced against corporation
formed and acquiring the property as the business successor of a partnership
which was the conditional buyer). But of. American Clay Machinery Co. v. New
England Brick Co., 87 Conn. 369, 87 Atl. 731 (1913) and Jester v. Naples, 94
Conn. 567, 109 AtL 894 (1920), in both of which the clement of notice appeared
clearly in the facts of the case, but was not adverted to by the court in arriving
at a decision in favor of the conditional seller.
20 Gordon v. Loer, 57 Idaho 269, 65 P. (2d) 148 (1937).
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court construes it. Purchasers, in the ordinary popular sense, incontestably are, since the statutes without exception mention them
particularly or make a sweeping contingent avoidance of the
retained title as to third persons. 2' As to mortgagees and pledgees,
where the statute does not mention them in terms or apply to third
persons generally, there is more diversity of opinion, with the
courts rather inclined to extend the benefits of the legislation to the
22
- former
and to deny them to the latter.2 But the Uniform Act
has taken care of the matter by defining "purchaser" to include
them both, and "purchase" to include their dealings. 24 It is not
altogether clear whether this includes antecedent mortgagees claiming under an after-acquired property clause aptly describing the
goods. The general tendency under legislation other than the Uniform Act has been to exclude such mortgagees from the benefits of
the recording acts. 25 Probably like results will be reached under
the Uniform Act, since, aside from situations where the afteracquired clause has been deemed not to cover the goods in question 0
or where the mortgagee has not relied on the mortgage but on proceedings for foreclosure under it by virtue of which he had become
an attaching creditor, 7 the only relevant authority deals with the
case where the mortgagee continued to make advances under his
contract after the inception of the conditional sale agreement,
giving him the benefit of the Act up until the time of the last advancement of funds but not thereafter.21 It may accordingly be
21See ihe provisions of the several statutes, 2 UNiFOEm LAws ANNoTATED
43-244.
22See 55 C. J. 1254.
23
The holdings are catalogued in 55 C. j. 1255.
2
4Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 1, W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) § 4007
("1 'Purchase' includes mortgage and pledge. 'Purchaser' includes mortgagee
and pledgee.") But the seller's title is displaced only to the extent necessary
to satisfy the pledge and may still be asserted as to the surplus beyond the
secured credit, Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc. v. A. V. O'Donnell, Inc., 253
App. Div. 1, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 608 (1937).
25See Gill v. Kahl-Holt Co., 47 App. D. C. 53 (1917); J. Bernstein & Sons
v. Allen, 127 Wash. 314,220 Pac. 801 (1923); 55 C. J. 1254 at note 42; (1939)
17 N. C. L. RBv. 442; of. Caldwell Lead Co. v. Home Title Ins. Co., 154 App.
Div. 83, 138 N. Y. Supp. 73"9 (1912) (antecedent mortgagee claiming under
after-acquired clause held liable in conversion for causing foreclosure sale to
bona fide purchaser of goods delivered on premises under duly filed conditional
sale, after its lapse by expiration of time and failure to refile).
28 Cf. Babbitt & Cowden Live Stock Co. v. Hooker, 28 Ariz. 263, 236 Pac. 722
(1925).
27 Cf. Williams Patent Crusher & Pulverizer Co. v. Relly, 118 Pa. Super. 64,
1802 At. 156 (1935).
8 Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Estates of Cotswold, Ltd., 17 N.
Y. S. (2d) 302 (1939); accord, Alf Holding Corp. v. American Stove Co., 253
N. Y. 450, 171 N. E. 703 (1930) (instalment payments under construction contract, to builder who was conditional buyer).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol47/iss2/3

6

Abel: Conditional
Sellers,
Hostile
Claimants, and the Filing
79Period
QUARTERLY
WEST
VIRGINIA
LAW
expected that, where the reliance is purely on the after-acquired
clause without the element of continuing payments to the
mortgagor, the mortgagee will not be entitled to claim the benefits
of the Act or of the seller's noncompliance with its terms respecting filing.
Aside from the Uniform Act, the extent to which creditors'
claims are protected by the recording acts is aLsubject of considerable difference of opinion. Whether they affect both prior and subsequent creditors or the latter only, general creditors or just lien
creditors, are matters on which the courts have divided, with a
decided tendency toward limiting their range of operation. 29 In
general, the Tequirement of filing and the protection which it affords would seem to relate only to the claims of lien, and not those
of general, creditors.30 The Uniform Act removes all doubt on this
score by speaking in terms of a "creditor . . . who . . . acquires
by attachment or levy a lien on" the goods." It will be noted that
not even all lien creditors are included within the scope of this
language. 32 For example, non-possessory liens, such as the statutory liens for labor,3 3 which have been treated under some statutes
as within the protection of the filing requirement 4 would seem not
to be within the Uniform Act. Perhaps the lien of a warehouseman is similarly unavailing against the unrecorded or tardily
recorded title of the conditional seller.35 Manifestations of a legislative purpose that particular liens, even though in no way con20

See 3 JONEs, op. cit. smpra n. 7, §§ 1112, 1113; 55 C. J. 1250-1252.

30 "General creditors of the conditional buyer ordinarily do not under con-

ditional sale recording acts get priority over the conditional seller whose contract is not recorded", VoLD, SALEs (1931) 301; accord, 1 WILLISToN, SALEs
§ 327a. The West Virginia law under the statute which preceded the adoption
of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act has been said to be contrary and to follow the minority doctrine of protecting general creditors, see 55 C. J. 1251
n. 1(c) ; but the cases cited for this proposition do not sustain it.
321Sec. 5; W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) § 4011. This clearly excludes general
creditors. Cf. Bent v. Weaver, 106 W. Va. 164, 145 S. E. 594 (1928). It would
seem to render the question of prior or subsequent creditor immaterial by directing attention solely to the time of the-levy or attachment, in disregard of
the time when the credit arose or-was extended.
32 " To hold here that all lien creditors were protected under the terms of the
statute would be to wholly ignore the use of the word 'levy' ", Bent v. Weaver,
106 W. Va. 164 at 168, 145 S.E.594 at 595 (1928).
33 In West Virginia, such a lien is allowed for work or labor in the construction, repair, or improvement of buildings or structures on realty, W. VA.
CODE (Michie, 1937) §§ 3726, 3727.
34 Cook v. Washington-Oregon Corp., 84 Wash. 68, 146 Pac. 156 (1915).
35 It was so held in Banker's Capitol Furniture Co. v. Hall, 11 N. J. Misc.
13, 163 Atl. 556 (1932). But of. Bloomingdale Bros., Inc. v. Cook, 8 N. J. Misc.
824, 152 Atl. 666 (1930) (sustaining seller's claim because as to the particular
claimant the ffling was timely, and discussing the situation on the basis of the
applicability of the Act).
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nected with attachment or levy, are to have due precedence over
the seller's claimed security, may also alter the picture, as where
they are subordinated to properly filed chattel mortgages and conditional sales (and thus by implication given priority over any not
so filed), a provision quite common in connection with garagemen's
liens for repairs and storage.8 6 The effect of such a statutory provision as in West Virginia that "any lienor shall take such frights
as a purchaser of the property deposited with him would take, and
shall take subject to other titles, interests, liens, or charges in the
same manner that a purchaser would take'3 7 seems never to have
been litigated. It may be assumed that its operation is limited to
the "'miscellaneous liens and pledges" recognized in the particular
article where it appears; but a lienor under that article may well
be regarded as within the protection of the conditional sales act
since his status is apparently not that of a mere lien creditor but
that of a statutory purchaser.
Even the question of who is to be deemed a creditor who has
"acquire(d) by attachment or levy a lien" on the goods is not
free from difficulty. For one thing, there is the problem of the
stage in the proceedings to take the goods at which the creditor can
be said to have acquired by levy a lien on them. In West Vir8
holding that the time
ginia the point is settled by Bent v. Weaver,"
of actual levy, rather than the teste or the delivery of the writ to
the officet for execution, is the crucial moment. In so holding,
the court recognized that it was departing somewhat from the
general West Virginia doctrine that the time of delivery governs,
but assigned the laudable desire to attain uniformity in the application of the act as its reason. 39 The subsequent course of decision
has disappointed that hope, since the few later cases dealing with

s8 Cf. Cherry's, Inc. v. Sharpensteen, 33 Ariz. 342, 265 Pac. 90 (1928) ; 0. I.
T. Corp. v. Jorgensen, 60 S.D. 7, 242 N. W. 594 (1932) (both decided in favor
of the conditional seller as against the garagekeeper, but expressly resting that
result on a holding that there was compliance with the filing requirements of
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act); accord, Commercial Credit Trust v. Barbier, 7 N. J. Misc. 1109, 147 Atl. 861 (1929).
37 W. VA, CODE (Michie, 1937)

§

3918.

38106 W. Va. 164, 145 S.E. 594 (1928).
89 Id. at 169, 145 S. E. at 596 ("Then again, as the lien of an execution Is
made by statute to date from the levy in some states; in others, from the time
the writ goes into the hands of the officer; and in others, from the teste as at
common law, may we not assume that the Legislature had this contrariety of
legislative action in mind, and in order to make the act uniform in its application in this respect, drew the line of protected creditors at actual levying
creditorst We think so."

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol47/iss2/3
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the problem reach varying results ;40 and, failing the achievement
of uniformity, it may be wondered if our court has not chosen the
less wise course in making the claimant's right to the benefit of
the act rest upon the diligence of the officers who have, at least in
some jurisdictions, been known at times not to be so very alert in
the performance of their duties. Another problem in fixing a
claimant's status as an attaching creditor within the meaning of
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act relates to the source of the
authority upon which the taking is predicated. In New Jersey
the view has been taken that the attachment must have been consequent upon judicial proceedings, to bring the creditor within
the Act, and that, accordingly, a claim by virtue of a landlord's
distress for rent has no standing as against the retained title of
the conditional seller. 4' In West Virginia it is not wholly settled
what the law is in such a case. Under the -anterior statute, the
right of the distraining landlord was superior to that of the seller
delinquent in recording the conditional sales agreement.4 2 There
is good reason to believe that probably that is still true under the
Uniform Act,48 and indeed it is possible that the landlord's lien,
of itself, without distress for rent, suffices to entitle him to the
benefits of the Act."
40 Compare Baker v. Hull, 250 N. Y.,484, 166 N. E. 175 (1929) (conditional
seller preferred where issue of execution was before but levy not until after
filing although in general lien attaches in New York at time of execution)
and In re Avlon Syrup Corp., 25 F. (2d) 342 (N. D. N. Y. 1928) (expressing the
opinion that in New York judgment creditor did not become attaching creditor
upon mere issuance of execution or at any rate lien without levy continued only
until return day of writ) with Williams Patent Crusher & Pulverizer Co. v.
Reily, 118 Pa. Super. 64, 180 Atl. 156 (1935) (creditor deemed attaching
creditor from the time of issue of the writ to the sheriff, if the sheriff thereafter before the return day makes the levy).
41 Commercial Credit Co. of Baltimore v. Vimeis, 98 N. J. L. 376, 120 Atl. 417
(1923), 37 HARV. L. Rv.161; of. Stern Co. of Washington, Inc. v. Rosenberg,
67 App. D. C. 99, 89 F. (2d) 843 (1937) (seller preferred to landlord under
statite
protecting third persons "acquiring title .... from said purchaser").
42 Huffard v. Akers, 52 W. Va. 21, 43 S. E. 124 (1902).
43 In Brown v. Woody, 98 W. Va. 512, 127 S. E. 325 (1925), a controversy
between a distraining landlord and a conditional seller under an unrecorded contract, a directed verdict for the former was set aside and new trial awarded to
permit a jury determination of the fact issue whether the landlord had actual
notice of the contract at the time of the distress warrant. In Bent v. Weaver,
106 W. Va. 164 at 167, 145 S. E. 594 at 595 (1928), after noticing the New
Jersey construction of the Act, the court remarked, "This court at least by
implication has held to the contrary as to such distraint for rent", citing Brown
v. Woody, supra.
4-In two cases since the adoption of the Uniform Act, Hawley v. Levy, 99
W. Va. 335, 128 S. E. 735 (1925) and Guthrie v. Howie, 110 W. Va. 164, 157
S. E. 168 (1931), the court has htd to determine as between the claims of a conditional seller and of a landlord who, so far as appeared, had not distrained on
the goods at any material time. In both the conclusion was reached, after care-
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If the conditional buyer's finances fall into disorder and his
property is taken over or turned over for the benefit of his
creditors, whether the person placed in charge of his estate is within the protection of the filing statute depends largely on the way
in which he acquires his authority. A trustee in bankruptcy, by
4
virtue of the 1910 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, " was accorded from the time of his appointment the status of a lien creditor
able to rely on the provisions of the recording acts in the same
manner as other lienors might from the time of acquisition of their
respective liens. 46 More than that, the continued recognition of the
applicability of the Uniform Act where a trustee in bankruptcy is
involved shows that he is not only a lien creditor but one who has
acquired his lien by levy or attachment within the meaning of that
Act. 4 7 But equity receivers, assignees for the benefit of creditors,
in brief all custodians of insolvent estates except trustees in bankruptcy, have only a derivative status, without statutory aider of
their respective claims. They succeed only to the position of the
insolvent, or the creditors, whom they represent, and, while they
may urge the filing acts in the few jurisdictions where general
creditors can do so, 4 s their designation gives them no independent
right to invoke the sanctions of such statutes as are limited to the

ful analysis of the facts, that there had been a timely, effective filing, and decision for the sellers was rested on that ground. In the latter case, the question
of the efficacy of a landlordts lien as against an unrecorded conditional sale
agreement was expressly reserved as being unnecessary to decide.
45 MASON'S U. S. CODE Tit. 11, § 7&. Theretofore his status seems to have
been only that of successor to the bankrupt, entitled to no greater rights against
the conditional seller. Cf. York Manufacturing Co. v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 344,
26 S. Ct. 481, 50 L. Ed. 782 (1906). In the recent recasting of the bankruptcy
statutes, the substance of the provision, somewhat amplified and clarified, has
been ietained, see F. C. A. Tit. 11, § 110e.
46 3 Jo s, op. cit. supra n. 7, at 209 et seq.; VoLD, SALES 301; (1930) 16
IOWA L. REV. 108. For a case recognizing the trustee's rights under the earlier
West Virginia statute, see Citizens' Coal & Supply Co. v. Custard, 244 Fed. 425,
157 C. C. A. 51 (C. 0. A. 4th, 1917).
47 In re Master Knitting Corp., 7 1. (2d) 11 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) (New York
statute) ; accord, In re Miller, 6 F. Supp. 79 (Dist. N. .T. 1934) ; In re Imber
Bros. Inc., 5 F. Supp. 513 (E. D. Pa. 1933) aff'd sub nomine Lamson Co., Inc.
v. Bland, 68 F. (2d) 369 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933) ; In re Excelsior Macaroni Co., 55
F. (2d) 406 (E. D. N. Y. 1931) ;jn re F. L. Bradbury Co., 8 F. (2d) 496 (E.
A. N. Y. 1925) ; In re Press Printers & Publishers, 4 F. (2d) 159 (Dist. X. T.
1924) ; see In re Ford-Rennie Leather Co., 2 F. (2d) 750 (Dist. Del. 1924). But
of. In re Golden Cruller & Doughnut Co., Inc., 6 F. (2d) 1015 (Dist. N. T.
1925).
48Ward v. Southern Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F. (2d) 773 (M. D. N. C. 1929);
Coble v. Wharton, 177 N. C. 323, 98 S. E. 818 (1919); Observer Co. v. Little,
174 N. C. 42, 94 S. E. 526 (1917).
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protection of lien creditors, 49 and, a fortiori,does not make of them
creditors acquiring a lien by levy or attachment, as prescribed by
the Uniform Act.G°
The state, or the United States, may constitutionally provide
for the forfeiture of a chattel used in violation of law, without
saving the rights of conditional sellers, however innocent of participation or acquiescence in the illegal use they are, a proposition
illustrated by federal customs and revenue laws and some state
liquor legislation.5 1 Most statutes are not so rigorous, however,
and in any event, as Judge Poffenbarger pointed out in State v.
HaZl, 52 refusing condemnation of a conditionally sold automobile
for violation of the West Virginia liquor law, the state is not as to
such matters a claimant within the reach or benefit of the recording act, there the Uniform Act. The decision is in complete accord
with the holdings of other courts under filing statutes of various
types.9 ' The flaw in the claim of the state is that it is not l purchaser or creditor." Hence, even though it may be regarded for
some purposes as having some sort of a special statutory lien, it still
does not bring itself within the class of adverse claimants mentioned
by the legislation; and so, under the Uniform Acts at least, it has
been denied standing to set up against the seller his remissness
49 1% re Bell Motor Co., 45 F. (2d) 19 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930) cert. den. 283 U. S.
832, 51 S. Ct. 365, 75 L. Ed. 1145 (1931) ; 3 JONEs, op. cit. supra n. 7, §§ 11281131. Contra: Doyle v. Yoho Hooker Youngstown Co., 130 Ohio St. 400, 200
N. E. 123 (1936), 2 OHio ST. L. J. 287.
GO
Quinn v. Bancroft-Jones Corp., 18 F. (2d) 727 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927) (New
York statute); Delaware Trust Co. v. Elder & Co., 12 Del. Ch. 263, 112 Atl. 370
(1920) ; Depew v. C. W. Depew & Co., 98 N. J. Eq. 461, 131 Atl. 76 (1925) ;
Koerner v. United States Waxed & Coated Paper Co., 91 N. J. Eq. 655, 121
Atl. 338 (1923); Mlodzik v. Ackerman Oil Co., 191 Wis. 233, 212 N. W. 790
(1926); of. Castaneda v. National Cash Register Co., 43 Ariz. 119, 29 P. (2d)
730 (1934); see In re Ford-Rennie Leather Co., 2 F. (2d) 750, 757 (Dist. Del.
1924).
5' 3 Jons, op. cit. supra n. 7, §§ 1416-1421; VowD, SALES 272, n. 76.
52 91 W. Va. 648, 114 S. E. 260 (1922).
53 Of. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 799
(C. C. A. 4th, 1928) (North Carolina statute); United States v. Torres, 291
Fed. 138 (Dist. Md. 1923) (Maryland statute); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. State, 170 Okla. 365, 40 P. (2d) 654 (1935).
54 State v. Hall, 91 W. Va. 648 at 653, 114 S. E. 250 at 252 (1922) ("That
law establishes a policy respecting creditors and purchasers for value and without notice.... But it does not invalidate nor qualify such a contract in
respect of its operation as to any other persons or its effect upon them ... The
right asserted here by the State is not based upon the relation of either
creditor or purchaser... "); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States,
23 P. (2d) 799, at 802 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928) ("Such laws ... are designed for
the protection of creditors or purchasers for value without notice, and the
government of the United States, in a forfeiture proceeding of this kind, does
not come under either class").
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in filing in a variety of situations not confined to liquor legislation
but extending to enforcement of such diverse obligations as the
conditional buyer's delinquent taxes 5 and fines for overloading."0
Just as the state, even though a lienor, is excluded from the
statutory scheme because it does not qualify as a purchaser or
creditor, it would seem that individuals attaching the property as
a mere procedural device- for instance, those persons suing nonresidents in tort and resorting to attachment under the familiar
statutes57 designed to compel appearance and satisfaction of such
judgment as may be rendered- would fall outside the statute.
The law on this point perhaps may be what logically it must be, but
the relevant decisions are few and inharmonious, 8 so that it is impossible to speak with any assurance.
Too much space has no doubt been given to this introductory
excursus on the issue of the persons who may claim the benefits of
the act. The only justification lies in the possible utility of such a
recapitulation for the practising lawyer. His first inquiry, in the
event of conflicting claims between a conditional seller and an
adverse claimant, should be whether the latter is such a one as
comes within the operation of the act. If not, the seller's title is
paramount in any case; unincluded persons gain nothing by the
legislation, and their position is always exactly the same as it
would have been had it arisen after the timely proper filing of the
agreement. It is only. those claimants who are within the coverage
of the act who ever have rights predicated upon the absence or
lateness of filing, and accordingly it is only where initial analysis
discloses such a claimant that the existence or nature of such rights
is material.
The other preliminary question is that of fixing the last date
when the contract can be placed of record and the filing still be regarded as timely. No special considerations are involved so far
55 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Whitfield, 62 S. D. 415, 253 X. W.
450 (1934) (taxes which had accrued before the conditional sale).
56 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hayes, 17 W. J. Misc. 384, 172 AtI.
,343 (1934) (alternative holding).
57 See, e. g., W. VA. CoDn (Michie, 1937) §§ 3852, 5026.
58
In Universal Credit Co. v. Knights, 145 Misc. 876, 261 N. Y. Supp. 252
(1932), the position was endorsed that those attaching in the circumstances
suggested in the text are not creditors acquiring a lien by levy or attachment,
within the meaning of the Uniform Act, the existence of a debt antecedent to
suit being necessary; but, in Hampton v. Universal Credit Co., 59 Ga. App.
568, 1 S. B. (2d) 753 (1939), where the attachment was of a similar character,
judgment for the seller was sustained explicitly on the ground that there was
a timely filing, the assumption being implicit that had there not been the
attaching plaintiff could have taken advantage of the omission.
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as the mere computation of the stated time interval is concerned.
The ordinary rules established in that connection, such as the
familiar doctrine that it is to be computed by excluding the first
day from and including the last in the reckoning, 9 recognized by
statute in many states, among them West Virginia,0 prevail in
fixing the time for the filing of conditional sales.8 ' The only real
problem is the determination of that first day, that is to say, the
ascertainment of the moment when the conditional sales transaction
has advanced to the point where the prescribed time limitation
with reference to recording commences to run. In this connection,
original filing, refiling on removal, and refiling for renewal may
best be considered separately.
First, then, as to the original filing. Under recording statutes
imposing the requirement without specifying a time for its performance, it can seldom be a material inquiry at what time that
requirement becomes operative; what indications there are point
to the instant before delivery of possession into the hands or upon
the premises of the buyer as the pertinent moment.62 Nor even
under statutes mentioning a definite time for filing would there be
much controversy if delivery of the goods were always concurrent
with the formation of the contract, and if there were never more
than a single contract and a-single delivery involved. But often,
perhaps usually, contract and delivery are not simultaneous; and
sometimes there is more than one contract or more than one delivery to be considered. o the courts in order to settle on a starting point for computing the timeliness of filing must initially
choose whether contract formation or delivery of possession is to
control; and, secondarily, determine what contract or what delivery.
The date of acceptance of the offer, when the minds of the
parties met and the contract arose, was held by a federal court, in
50 See 62 C. J.
6o W. VA. CODE

984.

(Michie, 1937) § 26.
61 Grunbaum Brothers Furniture Co. v. Humphreys Investment Corp., 144
Wash. 620, 258 Pac. 517 (1927); see Anglo-American Ml Co. v. Dingler, 8 P.

(2d) 493, 495 (N. D. Ga. 1925).
62Friedman v. Sterling Refrigeration Co., 104 F. (2d) 837 (C. C. A. 4th,

1939); Enterprise Fuel Co. v. Jones, 99 F. (2d) 928 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) (both
by implication, under the Maryland statute); accord, Huffard v. Akers, 52 W.
Va. 21, 43 S. E. 124 (1902) (but note that here the character of the adverse
claim, a landlord's lien for unpaid rent for the premises where the goods were
delivered, made delivery especially relevant). But of. Holt Motor Co. v. R. C.
A. Photophone, Inc., 196 Minn. 527, 265 N. W. 313 (1936).
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Chicago Pneumatic Tire Co. v. Arnold, 63 to be controlling to the
disregard of the later time of delivery, under a statute allowing ten
days "after the making of the contract". But, so far as concerns
goods first moving to the conditional buyer in consequence of the
contract, the decision has few companions. 4 It sometimes happens,
however, that the buyer has a possession, independent of the contract under which the seller claims security, whether by virtue of
a prior. conditional sale or other arrangements. That mere delivery
of the property, in contemplation of a conditional sales contract
which is never consummated, initiates no requirement of filing is
most directly demonstrated by Toledo Scale Co. v. Bailey ;05 and
perhaps it is similarly unimportant where both possession and contract terminate pursuant to a voluntary mutual rescission before
the time to record has run. ss As a logical corollary, where one
already in possession of goods in some other capacity enters as
buyer into a conditional sales contract, the period for filing runs
from the time of the contract and not from the original inception
of his possession.6 Analogously, where the parties cancel the original contract and in good faith substitute another with different
terms, the buyer remaining continuously in possession, it has been
held, at least as to claims posterior to the formation of the substituted contract, that the date when it is entered into is the significant date under the filing statutes.68 The abandoned original
contract becomes irrelevant 9 But the foregoing applies only to
63 282 Fed. 43 (C. C. A. 16t, 1922). The authority, if not the persuasiveness,
of the case is destroyed by the later inconsistent holding in Automatic Sprinkler
Corp. of America v. Rosen, 259 Mass. 319, 156 N. E. 693 (1927) infra n. 72.
64 In re Gosch, 121 Fed. 602 (S. D. Ga. 1903) construing the Georgia statute
in a similar manner was reversed on appeal in 126 Fed. 627, 61 0. C. A. 363
(C. C. A. 5th, 1903); of. R. P. Andrews Paper Co. v. Southern Soda Fountain
Co., 46 App. D. C. 84 (1917) (under statute by which contract was not recordable until acknowledged and was to be recorded within ten days after acknowledgment, recording six days after acknowledgment was timely although both
formation of contract and delivery occurred much more than ten days before).
65 78 W. Va. 797, 90 S. B. 345 (1916) (delivery by agent under agreement
in excess of his authority, which principal rejected). This case was under the
earlier statute fixing no time for recording but the principle would no doubt be
maintained under the present Uniform Act provisions. Accord, In re Bartlett,
281 Fed. 191 (N. D. Ga. 1922).
66 Cf. Twin Theatre Co. v. Liquid Carbonic Co., 134 Ga. 460, 67 S. . 1033
(1910).
67Lundquist v. Olympia Nat. Bank, 133 Wash. 600, 234 Pac. 453 (1925)
(possession after foreclosure sale, conditional buyer being mortgagor and
seller the purchaser at the foreclosure sale).
68 Colonial Acceptance Corp. v. Messick, 120 Conn. 585, 182 Atl. 133 (1935);
Jester v. Naples, 94 Conn. 567, 109 Atl. 894 (1920).
69 Cf. In re Baker, 5 W. W. Harr. 198, 162 Atl. 356 (Del. 1932) (Uniform
Act, sustaining seller's title as to property covered by a contract never
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abandonment and substitution of contracts, not to cases where the
initial agreement, though subsequently modified as to some of its
terms, remains alive and operative.70
In the usual state of affairs, however, the contract precedes
71
the delivery of the goods. Aside from a few aberrant decisions,
it is the accepted view that the time of delivery is the beginning
of the statutory period for recording.7 2

Nowhere is this more

forcibly stated, or the reasons more fully developed, than in the
7
opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals in Guthrie v. Howie, 1
where, after adverting specifically to the terms of the Uniform Act
which speak of filing in ten days "after the making of the conditional sale", the construction is found to be confirmed by the
fundamental purpose of the recording acts to protect those as
to whom the conditional buyer is given a false appearance of ownership by reason of possession.7 4 Of course, the seller may estop himself, by recording a contract containing false recitals as to the time
of delivery, from urging the subsequent true date when it did take
place ;75 this not because the contract controls but because of the
impropriety of his urging, against those who have no means of
information other than the record affords them, the false cast which
he has given it. Delivery, rather than the contract, being of
dominant importance, it does not extend the time for recording that
the parties agree to postpone formal execution of the conditional
recorded which later together with other property formed the subject matter

of another sale which was recorded).
70 Maryland Credit Finance Corp. v. Campbell, 8 W. W. Harr. 575, 195 AtL
277 (Del. 1937).
71 See notes 63 and 64, supra.
72 In re Gosch, 126 Fed. 627, 61 C. C. A. 363 (C. C. A. 5th, 1903); AngloAmerican Mill Co. v. Dingler, 8 F. (2d) 493 (N. D. Ga. 1925); Brandon Printing Co. v. Bostick, 126 Ala. 247, 28 So. 705 (1900) ; Automatic Sprinkler Corp.
of America v. Rosen, 259 Mass. 319, 156 N. E. 693 (1927); Monotype Co. of
California v. Guie, 134 Wash. 81, 234 Pac. 1046 (1925) ; Anderson v. Langford,
91 Wash. 176, 157 Pac. 456 (1916); Guthrie v. Howie, 110 W. Va. 164, 157 S.
E. 168 (1931) (Uniform Act); Hawley v. Levy, 99 W. Va. 335, 128 S. B.
735 (1925) (Uniform Act); accord, Allen v. Sterling Machinery Co., 110 Wash.
155, 188 Pac. 9 (1920).
73 110 W. Va. 164, 157 S. E. 168 (1931).
The case clears up the ambiguity
arising from some of the discussion in Hawley v. Levy, 99 W. Va. 335, 128 S. E.
735 (1925), where, although the actual tontract had apparently antedatea delivery by some weeks, delivery and the 6xecution of the formal writing to be
filed as the agreement took place on the same date, and the court referred to
them conjunctively in its statements respecting the filing period. The later
decision leaves it absolutely clear that the West Virginia court, applying the
Uniform Act, looks to the date of delivery.
74 See In re Gosch, 126 Fed. 627, 629, 61 C. C. A. 363, 365 (C. C. A. 5th, 1903)
for a similar analysis of the general principle.
75 Grunbaum Brothers Furniture Co. v. Humphrey Investment Corp., 144
Wash. 620, 258 Pac. 517 (1927).
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bill of sale pending certain intermediate events,78 nor that the sale
is made with the privilege of a trial, at least where it is in the
nature of a sale or return instead of a sale on approval."7
Designation of the date of delivery as the material one for
figuring the timeliness of filing goes a long way but still leaves
untouched the frequently involved problem of what amounts to
delivery for the purposes of the legislation.. Where seller and buyer
are located in different communities and the goods to be furnished
under the contract are to be shipped to the buyer, w situation common enough in view of the kind of property typically sold conditionally, there are several possibilities, espucially in view of the
ordinary presumption that title is intended to pass upon delivery
to the carrier.78 Either that delivery, or .the delivery by the carrier
to the buyer, or perhaps mere arrival of the goods at the destination
named in the bill of lading might conceivably be taken as the
effective delivery under the recording acts. The third seems never
to have been so treated. As between the other two, the courts
divide in results without amplifying the reasons for the choice made
and it may be without always realizing that they are choosing.
West Virginia decisions have stressed the date of delivery by the
carrier to the buyer,79 Alabama has preferred the lrlier delivery
by the seller to the carrier, 0 and two federal decisions, both applying the Georgia statute, have reached opposite results."' Where
interstate carriage is involved, the curious, though perhaps logical,
consequence has been proclaimed that such filing as may be requisite
in the place where the buyer is, and where the contract contemplates that the goods are to be, is not an original filing but a filing
on removal, and subject to the rules with respect to mode and time
which govern removal filings.8 2 Even more perplexing than the
element of intermediate carriage is the situation arising where delivery is not single, but takes place piecemeal from time to time.
Washington is firmly committed to the view that, if the contract is
7 National Bread Wrapping Machinery Co. v. Cowl, 137 Wash. 621, 243 Pac.
840 (1926) (pointing out the potential collusion and statutory evasion which
might result under the opposite rule).
77 Anglo-American Mill Co. v. Dingier, 8 F. (2d) 493 (N. D. Ga. 1925).
vs See 1 WILISTozN, SALES § 278.
79 Guthrie v.'Howie, 110 W. Va. 164, 157 S. E. 168 (1931); Hawley v. Levy,
99 W. Va. 335, 128 S. E. 735 (1925).
so Brandon Printing Co. v. Bostick, 126 Ala. 247, 28 So. 705 (1900).
sl Compare In re Gosch, 126 Fed. 627, 61 C. C. A. 363 (C. C. A. 5th, 1903)
(delivery by carrier) with Anglo-American Mill Co. v. Dingier, 8 F. (2d) 493
(N. D. Ga. 1925) (delivery to carrier).
82 Brandon Printing Co. v. Bostick, 126 Ala. 247, 28 So. 705 (1900). But of.
Anglo-American Mill Co. v. Dingier, 8 F. (2d) 493 (N. D. Ga. 1925).
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entire and not separable, the delivery of the last instalment fixes
the time for recording, 3 while Massachusetts insists that the first
delivery under the contract governs.8 4 That the Massachusetts
doctrine has at least the merit of simplicity is illustrated by the
necessity the Washington court has found of elaborating and
qualifying its position. 5 A third possible approach, nowhere
articulated in the reported cases, would be to take as to each
instalment the date of its own particular delivery, regardless of
whether the contract be severable or entire. This would conform
with the rationale announced in Guthrie v. Howie, of protdcting third persons against delusive appearances of ownership in the
buyer, and would impose no added burden except the slight inconvenience and small filing fees attributable to several filings instead of one. Moreover, since a filing vhich antedates final idelivery protects the seller in any event," it would not deprive him of
the privilege of effectively filing the entire agreement at once, if
he chose that alternative and acted promptly.
Except for the Uniform Act, specifi4 mention of removal between states or filing districts of goods held under a conditional
sales agreement is rare indeed. Mostly the matter is left to be
controlled by a judicious melange of conflicts doctrines and the
general provisions respecting recording. Where they do exist, such
provisions vary considerably. The somewhat commoner form provides simply for refiling within a specified number of days or
months after removal or introduction.17 This was the manner
8
in which the earlier West Virginia statute dealt with the problem.
Without entering into nice refinements unealled for by the facts
presented, as to just what point in the transfer of property between
83 Monotype Co. of California v. Guie, 134 Wash. 81, 234 Pac. 1046 (1925);
Anderson v. Langford, 91 Wash. 176, 157 Pac. 456 (1916).
.
84 Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America v. Rosen, 259 Mass. 319, 156 N.
693 (1927); of. Alf Holding Corp. v. American Stove Co., 253 N. Y. 460, 171
IT. . 703 (1930).
45 Compare Monotype Co. of California v. Guie, 134 Wash. 81, 234 Pac. 1046
(1925) and Anderson v. Langford, 91 Wash. 176, 157 Pac. 456 (1916) with
Grunbaum Brothers Furniture Co. v. Humphrey Investment Corp., 144 Wash.
620, 258 Pac. 517 (1927), 2 TExP. L. Q. 177; National Bread Wrapping
Machinery Co. v. Cowl, 137 Wash. 621, 243 Pac. 840 (1926); and Allen v.
Sterling Machinery Co., 110 Wash. 155, 188 Pac. 9 (1920).
s8Allen v. Sterling Machinery Co., 110 Wash. 155, 188 Pac. 9 (1920).
87 See ALA. CODE ANx. (Michie, 1928), § 6898; ALTA. CONSOL. ORDWANCES
(1915) c. 44, § 2(2): GA. CODE (1933) §§ 67-108; OxLA. STAT. A~NN. (Perm.
ed. 1937) tit. 46, § 58; SASK.REV.STAT. (1920) C. 201, § 3(2).
the said writing
88W. VA. CODE (Barnes 2d ed. 1918) c. 74, § 7 (" ....
shall, within three months after such removal, be admitted to record In the
county to which the property is so removed ... ").
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states or counties should be taken as the time of removal or introduction of which the statutes speak, the judicial consensus under
such statutes is that, once movement of the property is found to
amount to a removal,89 the physical fact of change of location
without more commences the running of the time to reffie.90 Occasionally the applicability of the refiling provision is confined by
its terms to the situation where the conditional seller has permitted
its removal, 91 even under one statute to the case where he has consented in writing.2 Construction of such statutes does not seem
to have found its way into the reported cases. Arguably they may
demand a concurrence of removal and the stipulated permission or
assent before the need to refile arises. Certainly they do look to
the seller's being aware of the removal and so, by indirection, make
notice of the fact an element. Aside from the Uniform Act, however, none of the statutes speak in terms of notice to the seller; but
the well-known provisions of Section 14 of that Act" call for refiling within ten days "after the seller has received notice" of the
ew location of the goods. The language is unequivocal. The statement in Banks-Miller Supply Co. v. Bank of Marlinton9 ' that "The
mere removal of such goods to another county ... does not affect
the seller's reservation. His rights are subordinated by the statute
to those of creditors, only upon his failure to record his contract
within ten days after receiving notice of the removaV
"' 99 seems incontestably right. And the decisions under the Act are unanimous
on the point that how much time may have elapsed since actual re89 Not every casual change of location is a removal. F or example, merely
driving an automobile on a journey into a state where it is not recorded is not
so regarded, C. I. T. Corp. v. Guy, 170 Va. 16, 195 S. E. 659 (1938) j and enforced detention by legal authority is not the basis for a change of location
necessitating refiling, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hayes Motor Co.,
17 N. J. Misc. 384, 172 Atl. 343 (1934) (alternative holding, Uniform Act).
The analogy of domicile of natural persons may be found a useful method of
approach to the issue of whether there has been such a removal as to set in
operation the reffiling provisions. See (1931) 17 VA. L. REV. 717.
go Pulaski Mule Co. v. Haley, 187 Ala. 533, 65 So. 783 (1914); Brandon
Printing Co. v. Bostick, 126 Ala. 247, 28 So. 705 (1900); Smith Motor Car
Co. v. Universal Credit Co., 176 Ga. 565, 168 S. E. 18 (1933) ; North v. Goebel,
138 Ga. 739, 76 S. E. 46 (1912) semble; Allen v. Dickey, 54 Ga. App. 451, 188
S. E. 273 (1936); Northern Finance Co. v. Hollingsworth, 52 Ga. App. 337,
183 S. E. 73 (1935); Yellow Manufacturing Acceptance Corp. v. McBride, 46
Ga. App. 137, 166 S. E. 873 (1932) ; Arnold v. Wittie, 99 Okla. 136, 227 Pac.
132 (1924). But of. Auto Sales Co. v. Yost, 91 W. Va. 493, 113 S. B. 758
(1922).
91 Miss. CoDE Awm. (Harrison, 1930) § 2142.
92IDAHo CODE Am. (Bobbs-MerrMl, 1932) § 62-801.
93 W. VA. CoDE (Michie, 1937) § 4020.
94 106W . Va. 583, 146 S. E. 521 (1929).
95 Id. at 586, 146 S. B. at 521. Italics in the original opinion.
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moval is immaterial, the important thing being for the seller to
record within ten days after he learns about the change.9 6 A-fore
obviously than as to the original filing, the statutes prescribe the
commencement of the time for refiling pursuant to removal; and
the differences in the results of the cases are closely responsive to
corresponding statutory differences.
Still rarer are statutes limiting the effective life of the record,
and requiring refiling in order to preserve the seller's recorded'title
from extinction by lapse of time. Such as do exist are quite uniform in what they direct, the only important difference being the
length of time for which the original filing endures. The Uniform
Act, in requiring a refiling for renewal "within thirty days next
preceding the expiration of each period", 97 expresses the substance
and almost reproduces the language of all the other provisions in
the field.98 The beginning of the period is mechanically fixed, its
ascertainment involving resort only to the calendar and a little
simple arithmetic. Given the date when by the terms of the statute
the first filing ceases to have effect, there only remains to check
back thirty days according to accepted legal rules for computation
of time; the interval represents the available period for refiling.
The wonder is that there has been any occasion for construction at
all -and there has not been much. One ease under the Uniform
Act holds, with obvious correctness, that a second renewal refiling
98 Cherry's, Inc. v. Sharpensteen, 33 Ariz. 342, 265 Pac. 90 (1928); Bradshaw v. Kleiber Motor Truck Co., 29 Ariz. 393, 241 Pac. 305 (1925); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Hild, 11 A. (2d) 428 (N. J. Sup. 1940) ; C. I. T. Corp.
v. Jorgensen, 60 S. D. 7, 242 N. W. 594 (1932); Richardson v. Lumbermen's
Ins. Co., 7 S. E. (2db 436 (W. Va. 1940); Banks-Miller Supply Co. v. Bank
of Marlinton, 106 W. Va. 583, 146 S. E. 521 (1929). The problem of what
constitutes notice under the section may indeed call for construction. Thus,
it has been held that any actual notice is sufficient, the provision not being

limited to the formal notice prescribed by Section 13 of the Act, Maryland
Credit Finance Corp. v. Campbell, 8 W. W. Har. 575, 195 Atl. 277 (Del. 1937) ;
on the other hand, the seller is under no duty to keep informed of the whereabouts of the property and is not chargeable -with notice merely from the long
continuance of the changed state of affairs, Bradshaw v. Xleiber Motor Truck
Co., supra; Banks-Miller Supply Co. v. Bank of Marlinton, supra. For a collection of authorities on the subject see 2 Umon~m LAws ANNOTATmD (Pocket
Part Supp. 1939) 63.
07 See. 11; W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) § 4017.
98 Cf. ALTA. CONSoL. ORDnANCES (1915) c. 44, § 2(4) ; 3 MicH. ComP. LAws
(1929) § 13427 semble; 7 N. Y. CONSOL. LAWs ArN. (M Kinney, 1917) c. 41,
§ 64 (repealed by adoption of the Uniform Act); OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. ed.
1937) tit. 46, § 61; Wyo. CoUP. STAT. (1920) § 4713. Occasionally the statute
merely avoids the effect of the filed instrument after a stated number of years,
2 Mnnr. STAT. (Mason 1927) § 8361, or does so unless an extension thereof is
filed, IOWA CODE (1939) § 10023, with no specification concerning the time of
refiling. Occasionally the need for any refiling is expressly negatived, KAN.
Gm. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) § 58-314.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1941

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [1941], Art. 3
GONDITIONAL SELLERS
must be within a year from the actual date of the first renewal
filing, it being insufficient that it is within a year of the time
when the unrenewed original filing 'would have lapsed;90 by filing
in the first instance before the final date, the seller relinquishes his
right to use that as the base date for subsequent refilings. Another
decision holds that the vitiation by lapse of time runs from the
initial filing rather than from refiling pursuant to removal, so that
a renewal refiling more than three years after the former but within
three years of the latter is bad, even though the original filing was
in another state.10 0 The decision seems erroneous, not only because
the purpose of the provision, to relieve from requiring too extended
a search of the records, 10 hardly applies to the case of extrastate
records of which the purchaser has no notice and to which he has
no access practically, but even more because it seems directly
counter to the final sentence in section 14 of the Act. 02
The principles for deciding whether a third person's claim to
the goods is such as is maintainable at all against that of the conditional seller and what is the proper period in which to file under
the recording acts have been explored in some detail. Between
them they provide complete solutions for those cases where (1) the
seller having recorded in due time, subsequently acquired claims of
whatever character are set up against his title, (2) the seller not
having recorded in due time, claimants within a protected class
have acquired their claims after the lapse of the prescribed period
and before actual recording. In the first situation the seller, in
the second the hostile claimant will prevail, in the absence of extraneous factors such as estoppel. No happy harmony of result bbtains, however, where, admitting the claim to be of such a character
that it might under appropriate circumstances be brought within
the scope of the legislation, the claimant has obtained it (3) before
there has been any filing but while the prescribed period for filing
99 Collingswood Trust Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 112 NT. J. Eq.
597, 164 At. 689 (1933).
100 Osgood Oil Co. v. Emblem Oil Co., 111 Pa. Super. 38, 168 At. 515 (1933).
101 The Commissioners' Note in explanation of this somewhat unusual provision runs thus: "If a contract extends over a period longer than three years,
a fresh record should be made at the end of three years. Searchers should not
be obliged to go back for an indefinite period to discover whether the title to a
piano is in the possessor of it", 2 UNiroRmf IAws ANoTATED (1922) 19.
Under the West Virginia modifleation fixing the life of the original filing at
five years, the reason is even stronger.
.02 "The provisions of Section 11 regarding the duration of the validity of
the filing and the necessity for refiling shall apply to contracts or copies which
are filed in a filing district other than that where the goods are originally kdpt
fbr use by the buyer after the sale."
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is still running, or (4) after the period has expired but also after
the contract has actually been filed. How do these situations stand
in respect to authority? and how in respect to reason Y
So far as renewal refiling is concerned, one who has acquired
his rights in the final thirty day period preceding the termination
of effectiveness of the original record will not prevail against the
seller, even though the latter delays or omits refiling. 10 3 Afts. all,
although the record is doomed to die within a month at most, it is
still just as live as at the date. of filing and continues so up until
the very last moment of its existence. The operation of the Uniform Act in this respect has been lucidly stated by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in its opinion in American Laundry Machinery
Co. v. Larson, where it is said that,
"A failure to refile a conditional sales contract destroys its
validity only as to subsequent purchasers and creditors. It
does not operate to invalidate the contract as to those whose
rights during the three years following the filing were subordinate to the conditional sales contract. The commissioners'
notes to this section state that its purpose was to make unnecessary such an extended search as would be required if the effect
of filing was unlimited in time. This plainly indicates that its
provisions were designed only to protect creditors and -purchasers whose rights accrued after the expiration of the three
year period. The sole effect of the failure to refile is to terminate, as to all persons who were not theretofore affected by it,
-the constructive notice accomplished by the filing.""
For the whole term appointed for refiling, by reason of the very
manner of defining that term, the seller's title is secured by a validly filed contract, so that strictly the situation raises no question of
third party rights asserted against contracts unfiled but still
susceptible of timely record. In this connection, therefore, renewal refilings may be dismissed from consideration, and attention
fixed exclusively on original and removal filings.
West Virginia has been prolific of decisions bearing on the
question; a brief recapitulation of them affords perhaps as convenient a starting point as any for its consideration. In both
Hawley v. Levy"'0 and Guthrie v. Howie,30 6 when the claim urged
(in both instances a landlord's lien) arose, the contract was un1o3 Buss Machine Works v. Watsontown Door & Sash Co., 2 F. Supp. 758
(M. D. Pa. 1933); American Laundry Machinery Co. v. Larsen, 217 Wis. 208,
257 N. W. 608 (1934).
104 Id. at 213, 257 N. W. at 610.
loc 99 W. Va. 335, 128 S. E. 735 (1925).
%o1110 W. Va. 164, 157 S. E. 168 (1931).
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filed, but it was thereafter recorded in due time; in deciding for
the sellers, the court necessarily endorsed the position that, so far
at least as original filing is concerned, actual timely record preserves
the seller's security title against intermediate claims as fully as
against those which accrue subsequently. Brown v. Woody,' also
involving a landlord's lien, presented the distinguishing circumstance that, while, as in the cases already mentioned, the claim arose
in the open period, the contract was not thereafter recorded- within
the prescribed time, indeed not at all; while judgment for the
claimant was reversed for jury resolution of a dispute as to whether
he had notice before his claim accrued, the fact that it was remanded suggests subsumption by the court of the view that intermediate liens or conveyances may establish some sort of claim, however inchoate and defeasible, which may ripen into superior right
unless defeated by timely action of the seller. If so, the attitude of
the court toward the open period for original fling and that for
renewal filing would seem to differ, since, in Auto Sales Company v.
Yost, 10 the position was taken that, throughout the open period for
re-recording after removal to a different county, the seller's title
was so far immunized that no adverse claim arising within the
period could ever ripen into a superior right, even though thereafter the full period lapsed without any action being taken by the
seller. The rather complete reliance of the reasoning on the operation of the original record in another county as notice despite removal re-enforces the idea that a distinction may exist between
this situation and that of an original filing, where there is no record
at all when the transaction occurs. It is true that the Yost case
arose under the earlier West Virginia statute and is not direct
authority for the construction to be given the Uniform Act; on the
other hand, it has been cited with approval, and in part adopted
as the basis of decision in the later case of Banks-Miller Supply
Company v. Bank of Marlinton.'0 9 The latter case does mot, however, in either the facts or the syllabus, 1" 0 go beyond the situation
where the seller, while not recording the contract, nevertheless does
actually notify the hostile claimant of its existence within the
period prescribed for filing; in such a case it settles the West VirW. Va. 512, 127 S. E. 325 (1925).
91 W. Va. 493, 113 S. E. 758 (1922).

10798
10

109 106 W. Va. 583, 146 S. E. 521 (1929).

110 Iid. ("Where the seller gives to the party to be affected by the recordaactual notice of the reservation of proption mentioned in section 14 ....
erty within ten days after receiving notice of the removal of the goods, recorda-

tion is unnecessary as to such party-.)
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ginia law in favor of the seller. Where the seller, instead ;f merely giving notice of his rights, retakes possession and restores the
property to its original location before lapse of the ten days allowed
for removal refiling, he would seem to occupy at least as solid
ground, and it is accordingly not' surprising that under such bircumstances his superior right was recognized, in Richardson v.
Lumbermen's Insurance Company.'1 1 In all these cases of removal
refiling, the hostile claims involved arose before the seller had notice of the removal, hence technically before the period for filing
even commenced to run; but this appears to be a distinction without a difference, and nothing has been made of it in West Virginia
or elsewhere. To summarize, in West Virginia the seller prevails
against claims arising in the open period for filing where thereafter he acts within that period, either by filing as prescribed by
the Act (certainly as to original filing and probably as to removal
refiling) or by "equivalent" action, such as giving actual notice
or repossession (certainly as to removal refiling and perhaps(?)
as to original filing) ; the hostile claimant prevails where the seller
remains inactive throughout the statutory period for original filing,
but the rule may be otherwise as to inaction pending the time for
removal refiling.
In so far as concerns the superiority of the seller's title over
intermediate claims when the contract is filed within the time
allotted, the authorities elsewhere without exception concur with
West Virginia in recognizing it, and this without regard to whether
original filing or refiling upon removal is involved. 12 Indeed, this
is so though the hostile claim attached before the contract was even
recordable 1 q3 -a situation having some analogy to dealings with
111 7 S. E. (2d) 436 (W. Va. 1940).

112 Brandon Printing Co. v. Bostick, 126 Ala. 247, 29 So. 705 (1900) (removal); Cherry's, Inc. v. Sharpensteen, 33 Ariz. 342, 265 Pac. 90 (1928)
(Uniform Act, removal); Hampton v. Universal Credit Co., 59 Ga. App. 568,
1 S. E. (2d) 753 (1939) (removal); Burgsteiner v. Street-Overland Co., 30
Ga. App. 140, 117 S. E. 268 (1923) (removal); Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Hild, 11 A. (2d) 428 (N. J. Sup. 1940) (Uniform Act, removal); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hayes Motor Co., 17 N. J. Misc. 384, 172 Atl. 343
(1934) (Uniform Act, removal, alternative holding); C. I. T. Corp. v. Jorgensen, 60 S. D. 7, 242 N. W. 594 (1932) (Uniform Act, removal); of. IA re Guild,
Bloomfield, & Jensen, Inc., 51 F. (2d) 818 (Dist. Conn. 1931) (original); Bond
v. Brewer, 96 Ga. 443, 23 S. E. 421 (1895) (original); see Anglo-American
Mill Co. v. Dingler, 8 F. (2d) 493, 495 (N. D. Ga. 1925) (original); Rowe v.
Spencer, 132 Ga. 426, 429, 64 S. E. 468, 469 (1909) (original); Bloomingdale
Bros., Inc. v. Cook, 8 N. J. Misc. 824, 152 AtI. 666, 668 (1930) (Uniform Act,
original).
113 Burgsteiner v. Street-Overland Co., 30 Ga. App. 140, 117 S. E. 268 (1923)
(statute required that notes be probated before recording, sale to bona fide
purchaser occurred before probating).
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removed property before the seller has notice of removal. Where a
seller who has not flied 'within the statutory period relies .on the
fact that information was otherwise brought home to the buyer
during that time, by notification, institution of or intervention in
a suit, or the like, the eases are in conflict. Two other jurisdictions
have held, construing section 14 of the Uniform Act relating to
refiling on removal, that such circumstances of knowledge are no
11
acceptable substitute for the filing commanded by the legislation, 4
thus leaving West Virginia alone in its interpretation of the Act.
Furthermore some states not having the Uniform Act sustain the
hostile claim unless there is a filing within the prescribed time, regardless of what the facts show by way of actual notice within
the period but subsequent to the inception of the claim.11" But in
others the seller derives the same protection from such actual notice
as from a timely filing.118 Where the seller goes beyond the mere
imparting of information and lawfully retakes possession of the
property from the buyer, thus in effect treating the sale as dissolved, it seems everywhere to be the rule that such a timely recaption defeats intermediate liens and conveyances as effectually
114 Thayer Mercantile Co. v. First National Bank of Milltown, 98 N. LT.L.
29, 119 At. 94 (1922); Universal Credit Co. v. Finn, 212 Wis. 601, 250 N. W.
391 (1933). The presupposition that the giving of actual notice is not equivalent to the prescribed filing is inferentially disclosed in such a case as Riecardi
Motor Car, Inc. v. Weinstein, 98 Pa. Super. 41 (1929), where the court resorted to labored and highly questionable reasoning to find the statute inapplicable and render judgment for the seller, while the same result could have
been reached quite easily by resort to the element of actual notice through institution of suit, had that been deemed sufficient to displace the hostile claim.
Superficially, Bradshaw v. Kleiber Motor Truck Co., 29 Ariz. 393, 241 Pac. 305
(1925) may appear to reach a different result, in conformity with the West
Virginia rule; but note that there the seller promptly upon going into possession under its replevin bond took the property back to the state whence it had
come, thus bringing the case within the recaption qualification noticed infraq,
text and note 117.
.15In re Dancey Hardware & Furniture Co., 198 Fed. 336 (N. D. Ala. 1912)
aff'Id nem. 201 Fed. 1023 (C. C. A. 5th, 1913) (removal, notification); Smith
Motor Co. v. Universal Credit Co., 176 Ga. 565, 168 S. E. 18 (1933) (removal,
institution of suit); Rowe v. Spencer, 132 Ga. 426, 64 S. E. 468 (1909)
(original, notification); Northern Finance Co. v. Hollingsworth, 52 Ga. App.
337, 183 S. B. 73 (1935) '(removal, institution of suit); see Motor Sales Co.
v. McNeil, 18 Ala. App. 132, 89 So. 89, 90 (1921). Contra: Industrial Acceptance Corp. v. Perry, 37 Ga. App. 480, 140 S. E. 774 (1927) (removal, institution
of suit).
116 Talmadge v. Oliver, 14 S. C. 522 (1881) (original, institution of suit);
df. Hinds v. Atlas Acceptance Corp., 183 Okla. 134, 80 P. (2d) 630 (1938)
(removal, institution of suit). The same result has been obtained in part by
holding the provisions for refiling to be inapplicable to property introduced from
outside the state, as in Goetschius v. Brightman, 245 N. Y. 186, 156 N. E. 660
(1927) (under New York statute anterior to the Uniform Act).
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as would a timely filing; 1 7 if Banks-Miller Supply Company v.
Bank of Marlinton represents a minority doctrine, Richardson v.
Lumbermen's Insurance Company at any rate is an orthodox enough
holding. Probably it is immaterial in any of these cases of actual
subsequent notice during the filing period whether what is omitted
is an original or a removal filing; at any rate, the cases cited Sn
both sides apply the chosen rule indiscriminately and place no
verbal stress on that circumstance. There remains the situation
where the seller has taken no steps of any sort during the period
designated for recording, to protect his security against lienors or
purchasers. Can imperfect rights capable of ripening into preferred claims against the property arise at all in that time? or is
it so thoroughly sterilized that whatever transactions take place
then must forever be subject to the seller's title in like manner as
those occurring in the final thirty days' existence of tht initial
filing? There is but little direct authority. So far as concerns the
original filing, the cases uniformly support the background hypothesis of (rutlhe v. Howie, Hawley v. Levy and Brown v. Woody
that inchoate claims may arise which will take precedence of the
conditional sales contract on expiration of the statutory time with
nothing done by the seller.118 At least two states reach the same
117 Motor Sales Co. v. McNeil, 18 Ala. App. 132, 89 So. 89 (1921) cert. den.
206 Ala. 700, 89 So. 923 (1921); of. Bradshaw v. Kleiber Motor Truck Co., 29
Ariz. 393, 241 Pac. 305 (1925) (Uniform Act). The Alabama decision is of
particular significance since in that state the law is that the giving of notice
to the claimant within the period does not protect the seller, In re Dancey Hardware & Furniture Co., 198 Fed. 336 (N. D. Ala. 1912) aff'd mein. 201 Fed.
1023 (C. C. A. 5th, 1913), mpra n.115.
11s Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America v. Rosen, 259 Mass. 319, 156 N. E.
693 (1927); of. Air Equipment Corp. v. Rubbercraft Corp., 79 F. (2d) 521
(C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Anglo-American M Co. v. Dingier, 8 F. (2d) 493 (N. D.
Ga. 1925) ; Alf Holding Corp. v. American Stove Co., 253 N. Y. 450, 171 N. E.
703 (1930); see Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Estates of Cotswold, Ltd.,
17 N. Y. S. (2d) 302, 304 (1939). A statute not elsewhere encountered formerly provided in South Carolina that "the recording .... of instruments
....
subsequent to the expiration of said ten days, shall, from the date of
such record, have the same effect as to the rights of all creditors and purchasers

without notice as if .... said ....

instrument had been executed and de-

livered on the date of the record thereof." 3 S.C. CODE (1922) § 5312. It is
not found in the corresponding section of the current code, having apparently
been repealed, see 3 S.C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 8875. Under it, claims arising
after the conditional sale, whether before or after the time fixed for recording,
were recognized as prior to the seller's title if lien claims, and on a parity if
general creditor's claims, but, by virtue of the quoted provision, the seller could
regain his priority as to any of the latter class which had not been converted
into liens on the property prior to the actual recording, whenever that took
place. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cross, 17 F. (2d) 417 (C. C. A. 4th,
1927); Carroll v. Cash Mills, 125 S. C. 332, 118 S. E. 290 (1923). The
significant feature of the cases for present purposes is their recognition that
claims accruing in the period open for recording might potentially give the
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result in dealing with the matter of refiling upon removal," 9 thus
rejecting the rule of Auto Sales Co. v. Yost; but that case derives
some support from an Arizona dietuM1 20 and perhaps, though not
unequivocally, from the Oklahoma decisions.12 It should be noted
that cases already discussed which require actual filing to protect
the seller's title and refuse to accept any substitute conduct, however timely or informative, as an equivalent, are authorities for
sustaining the hostile claim in event of the seller's continued inaction throughout the period; if superior rights may originate in
the filing period despite the fact that the seller does something "to
protect his title, a fortiori they may if he does nothing. The converse is not true. Courts willing to accept actual notice as a substitute for filing are not committed to sustain the title of a seller
who neither files nor notifies. Accordingly, all that group of cases
(including the only constructions elsewhere of the Uniform Act)
which refuse to treat timely notice as equivalent to timely filing
upon removal stand opposed to Auto Sales Co. v. Yost. The upshot is a substantial body of authority for the view that the intermediate claimant is to be preferred to the inert seller, regardless
of whether the omission is of an original or a removal filing; while
the doctrine of the Yost case has but flickering and feeble support.
Turning to the situation where, the seller having filed tardily,
the hostile claim accrues at a still later time, what do the cases
show? The question is of course only pertinent where the third
person has not, by examination of the record or otherwise, obtained
actual notice of the conditional sales contract, since, as has already
been seen, only the uninformed claimant falls within the statutory
protection in any event.
So limited, the problem seems to have been presented but once
in West Virginia, in Bent v. Weaver;1 2 in that case the Supreme
Court of Appeals sustained the seller's title as against an attaching
creditor who became such after the delayed filing. A like result
has been reached in analogous -cases elsewhere in apparently all the
claimants parity or privity of position as against the conditional seller's title.
Apparently the cases involved no question of ling upon removal.
119 Pulaski Mule Co. v. Haley, 187 Ala. 533, 65 So. 783 (1914) ; of. North v.
Goebel, 138 Ga. 739, 76 S. E. 46 (1912).
129 See C. I. T. Corp. v. First National Bank of Winslow, 33 Ariz. 483, 488,
266 Pac. 6, 7 (1928).
121 Compare Hinds v. Atlas Acceptance Corp., 183 Okla. 134, 80 P. (2d) 630
(1938) and Commercial Credit Co. v. Williams, 174 0kla. 160, 50 P. (2d) '141
(1935) with Arnold v. Wittie, 99 Oka. 236, 227 Pac. 132 (1924).
122 106 W. Va. 164, 145 S. E. 594 (1928).
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cases decided under the Uniform Act. 125 This concord is the more
surprising in that, aside from inapposite cases under statutes prescribing no time for filing 2 4 or defining expressly the consequences
of a belated record, 125 the courts in applying legislation other than
the Uniform Act rather seem to tend in the opposite direction.
The decisions under the statute of one state, Georgia,' 26 and scattered dicta from other jurisdictions, 27 conform with what is done
under the Uniform Act in their benevolence to the procrastinating
seller. But over against these are to be set holdings under a number of statutes, subordinating the seller's security title to bona fide
hostile claims perfected without notice where the conditional sale
was recorded by the time such claims attached but not within the

123 In re Excelsior Macaroni Co., 55 F. (2d) 406 (E. D. X. Y. 1931); In re
Avlon Syrup Corp., 25 F. (2d) 342 (N. D. N. Y. 1928); Castaneda v. National
Cash Register Co., 43 Ariz. 119, 29 P. (2d) 730 (1934); In re Baker, 5 W. W.
Harr. 198, 162 Atl. 356 (Del. 1932); Commercial Credit Co. v. Gaiser, 134 Kan.
552, 7 P. (2d) 527 (1932) (applying the Arizona statute); Morey & Co. v.
Schaad, 98 N. J. L. 799, 121 Atl. 622 (1923) ; Manchest v. Long Island Finance
Corp., 11 N. J. Misc. 718, 168 At. 35 (1933); Bloomingdale Bros., Inc. v. Cook,
8 N. J. Misc. 824, 152 Atl. 666 (1930) ; Baker v. Hull, 250 N. Y. 484, 166 N. E.
175 (1929); C. I. T. Corp. v. Miklow Realty Corp., 157 Misc. 120, 282 N. Y.
Supp. 447 (1935); of. Williams Patent Crusher & Pulverizer Co. v. Riely, 118
Pa. Super. 64, 180 Atl. 156 (1935).
124 Under such statutes the seller's title is protected against hostile claims
subsequent to actual filing, whenever that occurs, of. Emerson-Brantingham
Implement Co. v. Lawson, 237 Fed. 877 (S.D. Iowa 1916); Lawyers' Cooperative Publishing Co. v. Rose, 60 Ohio App. 258, 20 N. E. (2d) 720 (1930).
Since, as shown in Huffard v. Akers, 52 W. Va. 21, 43 S.E. 124 (1902), supra
n.8, the result of such a statute is to require immediate recording, it would be
particularly unfair to the seller should a failure to file "on time", i. e., at the
very moment the sale occurred, forever preclude him from doing so with full
effect. This difference in the legislation would seem to make decisions, under
statutes prescribing no period, of little authority under statutes prescribing a
period, and vice versa.
125 Under a superseded South Carolina statute, the relevant portions of
which are quoted supra n. 118, a tardily recorded conditional sales contract was
expressly given such effect as it would have had if executed at the time of
record; this statute, which affected even intermediate claims accruing at any
time before filing, a fortiori subordinated subsequent claims to the seller's
title, of. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cross, 17 F. (2d) 417 (C. C. A. 4th,
1927);
Carroll v. Cash Mills, 125 S.C. 332, 118 S.E. 290 (1923).
2
oIn 'e Brown Wagon Co., 224 Fed. 266 (S.D. Ga. 1915); Holland v.
Adams, 103 Ga. 610, 30 S.E. 432 (1898). In Twin Theatre Co. v. Liquid Carbonic Co., 134 Ga. 460, 67 S.E. 1033 (1910), the adverse claim accrued not
only after record but also after possession of the goods had been surrendered to
the conditional seller and the contract dissolved; under such circumstances, it
seems likely that all courts would unite in recognizing the superiority of the
seller's title.
127See American Clay Machinery Co. v. New England Brick Co., 87 Conn.
369, 375, 87 Atl. 731, 733 (1913); R. P. Andrews Paper Co. v. Southern Soda
Fountain Co., 46 App. D. C. 84, 87 (1917).
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time fixed by statute,12 8 thus giving the time designation something
of the character of a statute of limitations. Whatever the reason,
if any, all cases cited happen to have involved delays in the original
filings; there are no representatives of tardy removal filings; but
it may perhaps be surmised that the situations would be treated
alike, there being no indications to the contrary in the language of
any of the opinions.
Three cases, all under the Uniform Act but none of them in a
court of last resort, have passed upon the problem of delay in connection with a renewal refiling, with conflicting results. In New
Jersey, the cases dealing with tardy original filing have been treated
as controlling, and refiling after the lapse of the effectiveness of
2
the original record has been allowed to defeat later hostile claims. 1
In New York, on the other hand, belated reffling for renewal purposes has been dealt with specially, and held incapable of preserving
the seller's priority as against adverse claimats 113 With so few
authorities so equally divided, the question is a wholly open one;
but the very fact of conflict between jurisdictions which both have
the Uniform Act and which apply it alike where delayed original
filing is involved, does show that the result in case of tardy refiling
is not necessarily foreclosed by the decisions in case of belated original record. Courts which have not yet passed on the former
need not feel their judgments coerced by their treatment of the
latter unless they want to.
This review of the authorities gives a faithful and, the writer
ventures to hope, a fairly exhaustive account of the present state
of the law. Here journalism ends and criticism begins. Up to this
point, the reasons and rationalizations assigned for preferring seller
or hostile claimant as the case may be have been rigorously ex128 Air Equipment Corp. v. Rubbercraft Corp., 79 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 2d,
1935) (Connecticut statute, "reasonable time") ; In re Sunshine Steam Laundry, Inc., 47 F. (2d) 914 (Dist. Conn. 1930) aff'd mm. 47 F. (2d) 917 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1931) (same); Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Arnold, 282 Fed. 43
(C. C. A. 1st, 1922) (Massachusetts statute); Chilberg v. Smith, 174 Fed. 805,
98 C. C. A. 513 (C. C. A. 9th, 1909) (Washington statute); Bugbee v. Stevens,
53 Vt. 389 (1881); Monotype Co. of California v. Guie, 134 Wash. 81, 234 Pae.
1046 (1925); Cook v. Washington-Oregon Corp., 84 Wash. 68, 146 Pac. 156,
149 Pae. 325 (1915); American Multigraph Sales Co. v. Jones, 58 Wash. 619,
109 Pac. 108 (1910); accord, Grunbaum Bros. Furniture Co. v. Humphrey Investment Corp., 144 Wash. 620, 258 Paa. 517 (1927). But of. In re Guild,
Bloomfield & Jensen, Inc., 51 F. (2d) 818 (Dist. Conn. 1931) (Connecticut
statute, " Ireasonable time'1).
129 Collingswood Trust Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 112 N. J. Eq.
597, 164 AtL 689 (1933).
130 In re Kaufman, 1 F. Supp. 368 (N. D. N. Y. 1932) ; American Laundry
Machinery Co. v. Simon, 255 App. Div. 203, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 943 (1938).
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eluded, as they may always be in any discussion limited to the bare,
hard content of the decisions. But, in projecting the probable or
the proper course of development in the cases yet unsettled in any
jurisdiction, they constitute the essential and only decent materials
for prophecy. Whether and how far the rules in existing situations
are to be extended, limited, or even abandoned, as new cases arise,
sometimes does not but always should depend upon the weakness
or strength of the reasons supporting those rules, whether articulated or not. The remainder of this paper is not concerned with
either justifying or condemning the conclusions reached in partieular cases, for the writer has frankly been unable himself to
arrive at positive convictions, but with exploring their premises
and suggesting the criteria for judgment.
The purely statutory origin of the device of recording conditional sales contracts would lead one to expect frequent analyses
of the language and legislative history of the applicable enactments,
in determining the consequences of action or inaction. And indeed
reference thereto, at least by way of citation, is made in virtually
all of the cases, with quotations of extensive portions of the legislation not uncommon.
The doctrine of construction according to the object and general
purpose of the statute is sometimes alluded to; but there is an utter
lack of agreement as to what that purpose may be. The pronouncements range from attribution of a design for "the protection
of the seller and his assignee against purchasers and creditors of
the buyer ' 131 (a characterization quite plainly wrong since, by
virtue of the common-law validity of the seller's title, it is more
fully protected by the absence than by the enactment of filing
statutes) to the finding of a" clear purpose... to protect innocent
purchasers, mortgagees, and judgment creditors without notice","s2 a "principal, if not primary, purpose of protecting third
persons from the frauds bf vendors and vendees", 33 with multiform intermediate variations.13 4 There emerges out of this welter
131 C. I. T. Corp. v. First National Bank of Winslow, 33 Ariz. 483, 486, 266
Pac. 6, 7 (1928).
132 Pulaski Mule Co. v. Hfaley, 187 Ala. 533, 539, 65 So. 783, 785 (1914).
133 Grunbaum Bros. Furniture Co. v. Humphrey Investment Corp., 144 Wash.
620, 626, 258 Pac. 517, 519 (1927).
134 See, e. g. Morey & Co. v. Schaad, 98 N. J. L. 799, 801, 121 AtL 622, 623
(1923) ("to give notice to a bona fide purchaser or creditor of the exact legal
status and property rights of the parties, so as to enable such intending purchaser or creditor to guide himself accordingly"); American Clay Machinery
Co. v. New England Brick Co., 87 Conn. 369, 375, 87 Atl. 731, 733 (1913) ("to
protect persons who have acquired liens or interests in the property while in the
vendee's possession, not to give his creditors and others a perpetual right to
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of statements the suspicion that there is no disclosed legislative purpose which shapes judicial decision -that instead the courts, probably unconsciously, mould the imputed legislative purpose so as to
furnish the semblance of a reason for a conclusion otherwise
grounded. This becomes obvious when direct testimony, tending
to disclose an intention to accomplish something inconsistent with
the favored construction of the statute, is unceremoniously dismissed in the course of judicial divination of meaning. "3 However,
in one particular there does seem to be some vitality in an aspect
of the legislative purpose formula. The Commissioners' Note Lxplanatory of section 4 of the Uniform Act 130 has been vouched in
support of the holding that a tardily recorded title is to be preferred to subsequent hostile claims." 7 Yet it would be misleading
to state a general proposition that the purposes manifested in the
Commissioners' Notes will be controlling; for that part of the same
note explaining the holding open of a time for filing solely on the
ground of avoiding inconvenience to the seller,"8 with its evident
corollary that this is a matter of grace to him pointing 'out a way
to escape hardships consequent upon filing statutes which appoint
no fixed period, seems never to have been noticed in cases where
secure liens upon it, because of the temporary possession of the vendee");
(1934) 32 Mom. L. Rsv. 710, 711 ("to give notice to purchasers and
creditors"); (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 628 ("To safeguard the rights of those
who might otherwise rely upon the conditional vendee's apparent ownership").
2 UNIFOR LAws ANNOTATED (Pocket Part Supp. 1939) 8 lists judicial formulations of the purpose of the Uniform Act announced in various connections.
135 A conspicuous instance of this is afforded by Commercial Credit Co. V.
Gaiser, 134 Kan. 552, 7 P. (2d) 527 (1932).
There the court, construing the
Arizona statute, an amended version of the Uniform Act, had before it the
testimony of one of the Arizona code commissioners who drafted the amended
section involved, that "My own reasons . .. was (sio) to compel vendors . . .
to -record their conditional sales contracts within ten days from the date of sale
under penalty of having it declared void as to aZZ persons except the buyer"
(italics supplied). It was nevertheless held that a seller not recording within
ten days should prevail against a purchaser acquiring the goods without actual
notice at a still later date. The court was probably right in refusing to let the
testimony of the code commissioner-draftsman fix the meaning but its brusque
disregard of it suggests the true state of affairs respecting the extent to
which lekislative purpose really affects the decisions.
136 "A filing after ten days from the date of the making of the contract
of course protects the seller against all subsequent purchasers or creditors who
buy or levy on the goods". 2 UNIFORm LAws ANNOTATED (1922) 9.
137 Castaneda v. National Cash Register Co., 43 Ariz. 119, 122, 29 P. (2d)
730, 732 (1934) ; Commercial Credit Co. v. Gaiser, 134 Kan. 552, 557, 7 P. (2d)
527, 530 (1932).
V8s "Under the statute the contract is valid for ten days without filing. It
was thought unwise to require the seller to file immediately. The seller's omfce
may be far distant from the filing district. He should have a reasonable time
to mail his papers and get them filed". 2 UNIFoRm LA.ws ANNOTATED
(1922) 9.
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the adverse claimant acquires his interest innocently within the
filing period before record and the seller, whatever else he may do,
does not record betimes.23 9 Except perhaps for claims arising
subsequent to tardy actual record under the Uniform Act, the
object and general purpose of the legislation seems to be an element
only in the reasoning, not in the reasons, of courts.
Adverting to a different "canon of statutory construction",
one court has declared that the fling statute (which happened to
be the Uniform Act), being in derogation of the common law,
should be narrowly construed. 40 Over against this may be set the
remarks of a commentator objecting to another decision for disregard of the principle that "recording statutes are remedial and
should be liberally construed so as to attain the object intended by
them' ".
True, the case and the comment had in common that
the former applied strict construction to sustain judgment for a
seller who never recorded, while the latter urged the impropriety
of a holding against a seller who permitted the life of the original
record to lapse before refiling. But what kind of a rule is it that
does not cut both ways? and what genuine substance have the
canons of strict or liberal construction when either one may be
selected as a graceful way of phrasing the proposition that "the
conditional seller wins"? In -view of what has heretofore been
said about the status of conditional sales at common law, there is
no doubt that the filing statutes dorepresent a feparture from that
system. And what of it? *While some courts remain committed to
the canon of strict construction of statutes in derogation of the
common law,14 2 its baseless character 43 is becoming generally
recognized 44 and it has been expressly abolished in a number of
13o Since the assigned reason for fining a filing period shows that the consequences of non-immediate filing are displaced only to permit the leeway in time
of filing which practical business considerations demand, and since, tlnder
statutes appointing no time for filing, a claimant acquiring without actual notice
before record, however slightly delayed, would not be affected by later communication of information, institution of suit, or the like, the stating of the
reason would seem to negative the contention that any altered result was intended where the seller did not file but did something else; but no court has
been found emphasizing in this connection the purpose of the legislation as
disclosed by the Commissioners' Note.
140 Quinn v. Bancroft-Jones Corp., 18 F. (2d) 727, 728 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
141 (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. Buy. 628.
142 See, e. g.y Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W. Va. 774, 200 S. E. 350 (1938).
143 For an excellent exploration and explosion of the underling premises, see
Pound, Common Law and Legwslation (190S) 21 HA.rV. L. REV. 383.
.44 Cf. Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381, 59 S. Ct. 516,
83 L. Ed. 784 (1939) (by implication); (1940) 24 liNi. L. Rzv. 710; (1935)
14 ORE. L. REv. 290.
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states. 145 Even where the doctrine is in force, it is subject to the
qualification that remedial statutes are to be construed liberally to
effect their spirit and purpose. 14 The situation is particularly
complicated under the Uniform Act by reason of the express mandate of section 30'14 that "this act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the laws
of those states which enact it'"4 On the whole, it is doubtful that
there is much help to be had from the standard canons respecting
strict or liberal construction. The scarcity of explicit' mention of
them in judicial and extrajudicial discussions, whether it be due
to the decadence of the doctrine or to recognition that the statute
smacks strongly of remedial legislation, confirms the doubt. Here,
as ever, nonuse of the doctrine argues strongly for its irrelevance to
the case at hand.
Detailed verbal or contextual analysis of the applicable statute
to show just how it envisages the result arrived at is rare. Very
likely this is because court and counsel are often unaware of the
presence of the issues constituting the central theme of this discussion. Whether the claim igsuch in character as to be maintainable in any event against the seller's title and whether khe filing
was timely are carefully explored and the matter dropped there,
without apparent realization that there is anything further In the
case. Such perfunctory treatment is no less unsatisfactory however because of being understandable. The usual technique is to
incorporate the statutory provisions, by reference or by statement,
in the opinion and let it go at that, evidently on the assumption
tha their language expressly disposes of the controversy without
need for construction.
Occasionally a court has articulated the view that the statute
expressly disposes of the issues' 40 or, more cautiously, has phrased
'45 See, e.g., IowA CoDE (1935) § 64 ("1The rule of the common law, that
statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to
this code. Its provisions and all proceedings under it shall be liberally construed with a view to promote its objects and assist the parties in obtaining

justice".)

146 Hasson v. Chester, 67 W. Va. 278, 67 S. E. 731 (1910); 59 C. J. 1128.
VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) § 4037.
148 This principle led the Supreme Court of Appeals in one ease to reach
247W.

a result designed to promote uniformity which was contrary to both the general
statutory scheme of the state and its original common law doctrines on the
subject of the effect of attachments. Cf. Bent v. Weaver, 106 W. Va. 164, 145
S. B. 594 (1928).
149 See Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Arnold, 282 Fed. 43, 45 (C. 0. A. 1st,
1922); In re Dancy Hardware & Furniture Co., 198 Fed. 336, 341 (N. A) Aa.
1912); Chilberg v. Smith, 174 Fed. 805, 807, 98 C. C. A. 513 (C. C. A. 9th,
1909); Morey & Co. v. Schaad, 98 N. T. L. 799, 801, 121 At. 622, 623 (1923);
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the same general thought in terms of plain inference from the
statute."' Here or there an atypical statute may very well admit
of such summary treatment'5 i but it is the exception. Normally
the ipse dixit merely carries the day without also carrying intellectual conviction. The Achilles heel of the plain inference approach is neatly pinked by two opinions which point out the ease
with which the legislature could have disposed expressly of the
respective claims of the parties in the various contingencies considered in this paper, had it wished to preclude construction ;"2 the
cogency of the observation is demonstrated by instances such as
the former South Carolina legislation 5 3 where the consequences of
untimely filing, upon the rights of intervening and subsequent
claimants, are declared in apt language, thus showing that no unattainable finesse of specification is required should a legislature
really wish to speak its will. Equally fatal to the notion that the
statutes expressly dispose of cases where the hostile claimant without actual notice acquires his interest either within the filing period
or after a tardy filing is the divergence of holdings in the application of identical statutes. Even disregarding cases where different jurisdictions have interpreted the Uniform Act differently,
there remain enough instances where courts within the same state
have derived inharmonious meanings from a singie enactment 5"
to dispel any rational assurance that the statutes without interpretation or construction give the answer.
All this does not mean That the questions at issue lie outside
the purview of the statutes. Indeed, under the Uniform Act, no
Monotype Co. of California v. Guie, 134 Wash. 81, 89, 234 Pac. 1046, 1048

(1925).

150 See In re Avlon Syrup Corp., 25 F. (2d) 342, 344 (N. D. N. Y. 1928).

1'Such would seem to be the Georgia statute expressly analogizing the ling
of conditional sales contracts to that of chattel mortgages and thus disposing
of matters respecting the former which are settled as to the latter, discussed
iufra page 107.
152 See Bugbee v. Stevens, 53 Vt. 389, 393 (1881) (tardy record, subsequently
acquired hostile claim); Universal Credit Co. v. Finn, 212 'Wis. 601, 607, 250
N. W. 391, 393 (1933) (claim acquired in open period for renewal filing, seller
notified but never filed).
153 Supra n.117.
154 Compare Air Equipment Corp. v. Rubbereraft Corp., 79 F. (2d) 521 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1935) and In re Sunshine Steam Laundry, Inc., 47 F. (2d) 914 (D.
Conn. 1930), aff'd nem. 47 F. (2d) 917 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) with In re Guild,
Bloomfield, & Jensen, Inc., 51 F. (2d) 818 (D. Conn. 1931); Smith Motor Co.
v. Universal Credit Co., 176 Ga. 565, 168 S.E.18 (1933), and Northern Finance
Co. v. Hollingsworth, 183 S.E. 73 (Ga. App. 1935) with Industrial Acceptance
Corp. v. Perry, 37 Ga. App. 480, 140 S.E. 774 (1927); and Hinds v. Atlas
Acceptance Corp., 183 Okla. 134, 80 P. (2d) 630 (1936) and Commercial
Credit Co. v. Williams, 174 Okla. 160, 50 P. (2d) 141 (1935) with Arnold v.
Wittie, 99 Okla. 236, 227 Pac. 132 (1924).
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question between the seller and third persons can be independent of the statute, for, should no other provision apply, then section
4155 gives the automatic answer- the seller shall prevail."
But
a statute comprehends and controls not only the situations with
which it verbally expressly deals, but all those related situations
which it implicates by proper interpretation or construction. Its
text is only a skeleton which must be draped with the body of
doctrine that it is adapted and designed to support if the bare
bones of language are themselves to have life and motion; that body
of doctrines is supplied by the courts in defining and construing it.
The whole resulting mass of law integrated about the legislation
may then properly be said to be provided for by the statute; but
most of it is provided for only derivatively and not expressly. This
may all sound highly theoretical. Its practical importance is that
an understanding of it leads to straight thinking by judges and
attorneys when they are faced with the bearing.which a statutory
provision has upon a given set of circumstances. It is lazy and
inexact to shirk conscious construction by dismissing difficulties
with the blithe assertion that a statute expressly provides thus and
so; it is uninformative to rest decision on general principles or
canons of construction unless the existence in the particular case
of the conditions upon which the applicability of the canon is
predicated is made to appear. Neither technique has much to offer
in the matters here being dealt with; and, as the foregoing examination has shown, inconclusiveness, confusion, and shallowness
have marked the instances of their use. One must look elsewhere,
to cases where courts have tackled without shrinking the task of
construction, for principles and suggestions which really mean
much.
A characteristic response of the law to emergent institutions
and procedures has been the assimilation of the novel to the
familiar. It was foreseeable that this would take place in connection with conditional sales. However ancient their lineage may
be, their modern widespread use seems fairly attributable to a
wish to escape certain incidents of the law of chattel mortgages, a
security form which to a substantial degree the conditional sale
has supplanted. 1 7 The historical and functional relations between
the two almost inevifably inclined courts confronted by con155

. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) § 4010.

provision in a conditional sale reserving property in the seller
after possession of the goods is delivered to the buyer, shall be valid as to all
persons, except as hereinafter otherwise provided".
157 See VoLD, SALES 266.
156 11Every
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ditional sales problems to look for parallels in the earlier-matured
law of chattel mortgages. A very few statutes, after providing
separately for the filing of conditional sales within a stated time,
expressly direct that the laws with respect to chattel mortgages
shall govern in the determination of the consequences of compliance
or noncompliance; where they exist, the courts adhere faithfully
to their direction, recognizing that discretion has been withdrawn
from them and searching the body of rules developed as to chattel
mortgages for precedents controlling like situations involving conditional sales, pursuant to the statutory reference."5 8 (Parenthetically, it may be noted that that was what led the Georgia court
to hold that tardily recorded conditional sales should prevail over
still later adverse claims, the leading case registering the view by
way of dictum that the rule should be otherwise but for the legis9
lative command to follow the law of chattel mortgages,1 thus
weakening the force of the only unequivocal holdings, prior to or
outside the range of the Uniform Act, 60 in favor of the conditional
seller's title). Normally, the statutes make no mention of chattel
mortgages. The Uniform Act among others is devoid of any such
allusion.' 6" The omission has not eliminated and logically does not
negative the use of chattel mortgage analogies; it leaves the courts
free to take or leave them according as reason and sound judgment
may suggest. The interesting thing is to see how far there has
been an inclination in practice to borrow from the chattel mortgage field in working out the incidents of the conditional sales
filing statutes. In so far as the parallelism is an implicit background assumption not articulated in the opinions, it is of course
imponderable and undemonstrable. In so far as the association
158 Of. In re Brown Wagon Co., 224 Fed. 266 (S. D. Ga. 1915); Holland v.
Adams, 103 Ga. 610, 30 S. E. 432 (1898); Bergsteiner v. Street-Overland Co.,
30 Ga. App. 140, 117 S.E.268 (1923) ; Commercial Credit Co. v. Williams, 174
Okla. 160, 50 P. (2d) 141 (1935); see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cross,
17 F. (2d) 417, 421 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927) (South Carolina statute).
10 See Holland v. Adams, 103 Ga. 610, 30 S. E. 432 (1898). Eminent com-.
mentators in approving the Georgia position as stating the sound general view,
see BOGERT, Commentaries on Conditionat Sales, 2A UNiFoam LAws ANNOTATED
(1922) 90; 3 Joss, op. cit. supra n. 7, at 140, apparently have overlooked the
fact that this court, the only one squarely supporting it before the Uniform
Act, not only laid it down as a special doctrine arrived at under statutory compulsion but stated its view that absent the statutory declaration the contrary
rule would be reached.
GoSee the discussion supra text and notes 124-128.
161 While the Act makes no mention of chattel mortgage recording, its relation to the filing of conditional sales was discussed by its learned draftsman,
see Bogert, supra n. 159, at 73, who seems to take the position that on principle
they have much in common if indeed they are not strictly parallel
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of the two manifests itself merely in the choice of authorities cited
to support or bolster decision, there exist the data relevant to
appraisal; but the examination would be pso tedious and complicated
that it is doubtful whether it would be worth the doing. It is
enough to review only that more limited group of authorities where
the matter of correspondence between recording chattel mortgages
and filing conditional sales is raised by the language employed.
West Virginia has accepted unreservedly the proposition that
chattel mortgage cases are direct authority as to similar situations
in connection with conditional sales,1 62 specifically in controversies
between a claimant whose interest attached in the open period Tor
removal refiing and a seller who failed to file but took other steps
to assert his title. Under similar circumstances there has been a
like reaction elsewhere. 103 Furthermore, in other types of controversies, there has been this substantial identification of the fiind of
conditional sales and the recording of chattel mortgages.1 0' On the
other hand, there is equally respectable authority denying the interchangeability of the law, whether as to the status of adverse interests arising in the open period for renewal refiling" 5 or as to the
effect upon subsequently accruing claims of the failure to file within
the time allotted. 60 The divergence of holdings is not explainable
162 Cf. Richardson v. Lumbermen's Ins. Co., 7 S. E. (2d) 436, 438 (W. Va.
1940) ; Auto Sales Co. v. Yost, 91 W. Va. 493, 495, 113 S. E. 758, 759 (1922)
("Such is the great weight of authority as applicable to chattel mortgages; and
we think the same rule is applicable to contracts of conditional sales with
reservation of title"). The recent case arose under the Uniform Act, the
earlier one under the prior West Virginia statute. It is interesting to note that
the merger of doctrine has become so complete in this jurisdiction that the
court in the Richardson Case was able to misread its own earlier decision in the
Yost Case as a case which ""applied to a chattel mortgage" without according
it any the less weight as an authority - surely an ultimate in the unification of
the doctrines!
163 Cf. Commercial Credit Co. v. Gaiser, 134 Kan. 552, 555, 7 P. (2d) 527,
529 (1932) (where the court examined its local chattel mortgage decisions to
discover the meaning of the Arizona conditional sales act, the corresponding
Kansas statute providing "that conditional sales have the same potency as
The conditional sales
chattel mortgages and upon the same conditions".)
situation has also been analogized to that of the absolute sale with retention of
possession by the seller, In re Dany Hardware & Furniture Co., 198 Fed. 336

(N. D. Ala. 1912).

104 Of. In te Avlon Syrup Corp., 25 F. (2d) 342, 344 (N. D. X. Y. 1928)
(tardy record, adverse claim still later in time); Morey & Co. v. Schaad, 98
N. T. L. 799,. 802, 121 Atl. 622, 623 (1923) (same) ; In re Kaufman, I F. Supp.
368 (N. D. N. Y. 1932) (failure to refile for renewal before expiration of
original filing); Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Lawson, 237 Fed.
877 (S. D. Iowa 1916) (nature of claims assertable against unrecorded con-

tra&t)

165 Cf. Pulaski Mule Co. v. Haley, 187 Ala. 533, 539, 65 So. 783, 785 (1914).
10 Cf. Quinn v. Bancroft-Jones Corp., 18 F. (2d) 727, 728 (C. C. A. 2d,
1927); Chilberg v. Smith, 174 Fed. 805, 807, 98 C. C. A. 513 (C. C. A. 9th,
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on the ground of differences in statutory provisions; for it is t6 be
observed that cases involving application of the Uniform Act are
to be found on both sides of the doctrinal fence. 167 On the pure
logic of the matter, it is perhaps impossible to determine which side
deserves the palm. If an analysis of th~institutional attributes of
the two forms of security disclosed no ignificant differences or if
a historical examination showed that the legislature had the chattel
mortgage model in mind when dealing with conditional sales, that
would incline the scale toward treating them the same; but in none
(if the cases is there to be found either functional or historical
analysis of their relation. For treating them alike, there may be
instanced considerations of judicial convenience and certainty.
Against it is the danger that a priori identification will tend to
perpetuate in conditional sales law harsh or awkward results fixed
in chattel mortgage law by the rule of stare decisis and the still
graver danger, under the Uniform Act, that the variations in local
rules bearing on chattel mortgages will substantially destroy the
uniformity which the Act seeks to achieve.168 This last is perhaps
the weightiest single factor to be considered in Uniform Act jurisdictions. In the prevailing absence of any clear consensus, the
chattel mortgage cases, while pertinent, hardly seem independently sufficient as a basis of reasoning in the conditional sales field.
If the foregoing approaches to the problem leave the impression
of mere shadow-boxing with the issues, the same objection cannot
be levelled against those cases and discussions which treat of the
relative rights of seller and claimant in terms of notice of the contract. Constructive notice is, of course, what is meant; for, as
already observed, actual notice including knowledge of circumstances sufficient to arouse inquiry effectually excludes a claimant
from the class of those who can in any event contest the seller's
1908); In re Excelsior Macaroni Co., 55 F. (2d) 406 (E. D. N. Y. 1931) (all
dealing with tardy original filing); see (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. RBv. 628, condemning In re Kaufman, 1 F. Supp. 368 (N. D. N. Y. 1932) supra n. 164, and
characterizing the decision as "strongly influenced by an unfortunate ana ogy
to mortgages" (italics supplied).
1673Holding that the chattel mortgage cases apply: In re Kaufman, 1 F.
Supp. 368 (N. D. N. Y. 1932); In re Avlon Syrup Corp., 25 F. (2d) 342 (N. D.
N. Y. 1928); Commercial Credit Co. v. Gaiser, 134 Kan. 552, 7 P. (2d) 527
(1932) (Arizona statute); Morey & Co. v. Schaad, 98 N. J. L. 799, 121 AtI. 622
(1923); Richardson v. Lumbermen's Ins. Co., 7 S. E. (2d) 436 (W. Va. 1940)
(based primarily on earlier pre-Uniform Act decision). Holding that they do
not: Quinn v. Bancroft-Jones Corp., 18 F. (2d) 727 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927) (New
York statute); In re Excelsior Macaroni Co., 55 F. (2d) 406 (E. D. N. Y.

1931).
16s § 4; W. VA. CODE (Michlie, 1937) § 4037.
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title. Legislation respecting the filing of conditional sales contracts, like all the family of statutes with respect to public records,
is rooted in the concept of constructive notice, that is to say, in the
idea of contingently imposing upon persons in fact without notice
of the true state of affairs the consequences of full knowledge.
The open question under such statutes is the determination of the
contingencies .upon which innocent ignorance will be unavailing as
a shield. So far as they address themselves to that question, the
opinions give honest guides to the understanding, however much
one may disagree with the particular choices made or the views of
policy which they presuppose.
There is no dispute of the proposition that timely proper
filing of the contract gives constructive notice of its existence while
the goods remain within the filing district, throughout whatever
period of time the law appoints for the life of the filing. Not only
third persons 'whose claims to the goods arise after the filing, but
also those acquiring their interests in the intermediate period following the sale, are charged with notice, provided that the filing
has been timely."" The troublesome questions are, (1) Are persons
dealing with goods introduced into the state or the filing district
from outside to be charged with knowledge of extraterritorial contracts?, (2) Are hostile claimants to be held as fully cognizant of a
tardy filing as of a prompt and proper record complying with the
statute?, (3) Does the retroactive character legislatively conferred
upon timely filing extend as well to the furnishing of actual notice
within the filing period, so as to relate such notice back? To each
of these questions, answers affirmative and answers negative have
been returned.
The West Virginia cases provide an interesting if slightly
indecisive array of authorities on the question of how far those
dealing with goods under the circumstances and within the period
appointed for renewal refiling are chargeable with knowledge of
the contract. The leading case170 held unequivocally that the
original filing was notice to all'the world, including that part of it
beyond the bounds of the filing district, until expiration of the
time for renewal filing, so as to prevent acquisition of adverse interests untainted by the consequences of knowledge, during that
169 See Cherry's, Ine. v. Sharpensteen, 33 Ariz. 342, 348, 265 Pac. 90, 92
(1928); Hampton v. Universal Credit Co., 59 Ga. App. 568, 1 S. E. (2d) 753,
754 (1939); Bergsteiner v. Street-Overland Co., 30 Ga. App. 140, 117 S. B.
268, 269 (1923).
170 Auto Sales Co. v. Yost, 91 W. Va. 493, 113 S. E. 758 (1922).
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time. Such may still be the law for the case continues to be cited;11
but it is interesting to observe that in both the subsequent cases
where the doctrine, in its most extended form, might have been
applicable, the court preferred to rest decision on other grounds
one, on the equivalence of timely actual notice to timely
-in
filing, 17 2 in the other on the efficacy of a prompt retaking of possession to defeat third-party claims. 7 3 The implications of Broum
v. Woody 7 would seem to suggest that to affect the innocent
purchaser with the consequences of notice, there must at least be
some record somewhere and that he will not be charged with notice
by the mere existence of the contract. Moreover, in West Virginia,
he has to date been held only to a knowledge of the filing in a different county within the state and not yet disqualified on the more
extreme ground of record in another state. 7 5 In these respects,
our court ds not yet committed so fully to the imputation of notice
as those in a few other states will hereafter be observed by the
language or circumstances of their cases to be. On the other hand,
West Virginia seems to have pursued the logic of the notice theory
further than has elsewhere been done in treating the hostile claim
as being thoroughly nipped in the bud by the accident of having
posattached during the open period for removal refiling, beyond
6
inactionY.1
long-continued
seller's
the
by
sibility of revival
The notion that record in one county gives notice in another
during the running of the period for removal refiling has been
endorsed elsewhere. 7 Moreover, expressions in one case suggest
that like effect is to be given to record in another state where the
171 See Richardson v. Lumbermen's Ins. Co., 7 P. E. (2d) 436, 438 (W. Va.
1940); Banks-Miller Supply Co. v. Bank of Marlinton, 106 W. Va. 583, 585,
146 S. E. 521, 522 (1929).
172 aid.

173 Richardson v. Lumbermen's Ins. Co., 7 S. E. (2d) 436 (W. Va. 1940).
'174 98 W. Va. 512, 127 S. E. 325 (1925) mpra n. 107. The same complete
absence of a record - none being required in Tennessee, the state where the
property was located under the conditional sale and whence it was brought to
West Virginia - was involved in Richardson v. Lumbermen's Ins. Co., 7 S. B.
(2d) 436 (W. Va. 1940) and may have been a motivating circumstance in the
court's election to rest the decision on a basis other than that of notice.
1275The extrastate character of the conditional sale, valid where made without record, may have influenced decision in Richardson v. Lumbermen's Ins.
Co., 7 S. E. (2d) 436 (W. Va. 1940) supra n. 174.
176 See the discussion supra page 94.
177 See Commercial Credit Co. v. Williams, 174 Okla. 160, 50 P. (2d) 141,
142 (1935). In Smith v. Simmons, 35 Ga. App. 427, 133 S. B. 412 (1926), the
same principle was announced; but it is to be noted that the Georgia statutes
do not fix a time for, nor seemingly do they require a removal refiling when the
removal is between different counties in the state but only when the goods are
brought in from outside the state.
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conditional sale took place.1 7 8 On the other hand, the operation
of the record as notice even in a different county of the same state
has been bluntly denied. 1 9 There is nothing very startling in a
state's mnaking notice effective throughout its borders instead of
just in the particular county where the instrument is filed, if it so
desires; and, while it is somewhat more extraordinary to require
citizens to know at their peril the contents of the official records
in the two thousand-odd counties of the other'forty seven states,
a state is at liberty to go that far if it wishes, thus domesticating
pro tanto recorded papers throughout the Union. Indeed, as to
chattel mortgages the settled practice sqems to be just that. 180 But
for courts to do so in connection with the filing of conditional sales
is to invite headaches. If, for instance, there is to be constructive
notice of contracts duly filed in other states, what about the situation of conditionally sold goods coming in from a state where no
recording is required and the contract for which has accordingly
not been filed?"' what of the even more complicated case where the
contract has not been filed as provided by statute, so that the retained title would have been ineffective had the goods stayed at
home 7182 Confronted .with these situations, the courts have either
by dexterity or obtuseness avoided giving an answer; but that does
not eliminate the logical difficulties if it be held that notice seeps
across state lines. To differentiate initially valid contracts on the
basis of whether the state of their making does or does not require
recording seems an invidious attempt to exact concurrence with the
procedures of the forum from other states as the price of recognizing transactions occurring within them. On the other hand,
to charge the local community with notice iof some unrecorded
foreign contracts but not of others, depending upon the statutory
schemes of other states, is at once to make an equally 6nvidious
distinction and to erect a presumption of knowledge of foreign
law. If, in a liberal mood, the court holds people to notice of
extrastate contracts even though unrecorded, it acts inconsistently
with the manner in which it must act in the case of removal 'Df
178 See Arnold v. Wittie, 99 Okla. 236, 238, 227 Pac. 132, 134 (1924).
179 Pulaski Mule Co. v. Haley, 187 Ala. 533, 65 So. 783 (1914) ; of. 0. 1. T.
Corp. v. First National Bank of Winslow, 33 Ariz. 483, 266 Pac. 6 (1928) (by

implication).

180 See 2 JONEs, op. cit. supra n. 7, §§ 260, 260a; 14 C. T. S. § 758.
181This was the situation in, e. g., Cherry's, Inc.* v. Sharpensteen, 33 Ariz.

342, 265 Pac. 90 (1928) and in Richardson v. Lumbermen's Ins. Co., 7 S. E.
(2d) 436 (W. Va. 1940).
182 As in, e. g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Eld, 11 A. (2d) 428 (N. 3. Sup.
1940) ana Riceardi Motor Cars, Inc. v. Weinstein, 98 Pa. Super. 41 (1929).
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goods between counties within the state, since there it cannot be
.held that there is notice bf unflled conditional sales without in
effect repealing the recording acts. These difficulties might be
thought to confirm the wisdom of the Supreme Court of Appeals
in veering away from the rationale announced in Auto Sales (o. v.
Yost when confronted in Richardson v. Lumbermen's Insurance
Co. with goods of extrastate origin; but this approach, too, has its
difficulties. Whatever might be said for it under statutes requiring
refiling only as to removals within the state or only as to removals
into the state, the Uniform Act deals indifferently with both,
making no distinctions between them. To develop any distinction
between interstate and intercounty movements under such a statute
would seem to be the crassest kind of judicial legislation. And,
even if the notice is only notice of contracts filed anywhere within
the state and not of extrastate contracts, (what then is the point in
providing at all for refiling upon removal, or indeed of specifying
any place for fling? Yet it is held that a filing at an improper
place is nugatory although induced by the fraud of the buyer as
to the place of intended use of the goods 8 3 and that a failure to
refile on removal precludes the assertion of title even as against
a member of the buyer's family acquiring the goods from him' cases in which the seller might certainly be thought to have strong
equities if the original filing gives statewide notice and the refiling is merely an incident in the continuation of such notice The
simplest thing to do would be to scrap the whole doctrine that filing
gives notice beyond the boundaries of the filing district. It is not
necessary to employ it in order to protect a seller who records
within the designated period for removal refiling; and aside from
holding that period open, no decision except the Yost case has
carried out the implications of the proposition. That case, indeed,
treated the "notice" like actual notice or the more orthodox type
of constructive notice, as clinging to the buyer forever; but elsewhere, even when recognized, it seems to be so only as a temporary
sort of thing, not possessing the qualities of actual or even of
normal constructive notice.'8 5 So evanescent a concept so beset
183 Of. Ward v. Southern Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F. (2d)

773 (M. D. N. C.

1929).

184 Cf. Maryland Finance Corp. v. Campbell, 8 W. W. Harr. 575, 195 At. 277

(Del. 1937).

185 In Oklahoma, the only other state where the doctrine has been as distinctly announced as in West Virginia, a mortgage placed upon the goods within the open period for renewal refiling was preferred to the conditional sale
where the seller did nothing within the time to protect his title and where

possession was surrendered to the mortgagee at a later date, the court recog-
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with logical difficulties and which, except for the Yost case, has
never accomplished anything that could not have been supported
otherwise might better be discarded. The law would lose nothing of
consequence and would gain in clarity if the notion of constructive
notice of conditional sales beyond the borders of the filing district
were Tejected by the few jurisdictions that advance it.
Whether the consequences of notice extend beyond the filing
district is a question different in kind from whether tardy filing
serves thenceforth as notice or whether timely actual notice is the
equivalent of timely filing even to the extent of operating retroactively. The former assumes the sufficiency' of the facts set up to
give constructive notice at least locally and inquires into the attributes to be ascribed thereto, involving the risks, canvassed above,
which inhere in formulating a rational uniform treatment for
accidental multiform fact patterns, in the event the extraterritorial
thesis is adopted. The latter two problems have a common nucleus;
they raise only the question whether particular matters do operate
as constructive notice, without seeking to redefine the conventional
incidents of such notice. Hence they are quite free from the logical
and administrative difficulties which were seen to bedevil the other
question. Disagreements as to them lie wholly in the realm of
policy.
Addressing himself to the issue of postponed filing, a learned
writer has commented:
"To say that under such circumstances the vendor has lost
his claim to property is to say that the statute has erected an
arbitrary limit, a dead line, as it were, beyond and after which
recording is a useless act, and that no notice is imparted by a
record made after the expiration of the time named."'
This overlooks the rare case where the hostile claimant by examining the records in fact has actually learned of the contract before
acting, in which case it would doubtless be as effective as any other
actual notice; but with that minor qualification the quotation
states the problem squarely. Its author expresses the firm conviction that the tardy filing should be constructive notice from the
nizing that the filing constituted constructive notice but holding that by his inaction the seller had permitted the notice to lapse. Arnold v. Wittie, 99 Okla.
236, 227 Pac. 132 (1924). But cf. C. I. T. Corp. v. First National Bank of
Winslow, 33 Ariz. 483, 266 Pac. 6 (1928). It needs scarcely be stated that had
the mortgagee taken with actual notice or with the ordinary breed of constructive notice, the result must have been otherwise, of. Buss Machine Works v.
Watsontown Door & Sash Co., 2 F. Supp. 758 (M. D. Pa. 1933); American
Laundry Machinery Co. v. Larsen, 217 Wis. 208, 257 N. W. 608 (1934).
18 3 JoNEsm, op. cit. supra n. 7, § 1068.
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time it takes place.187 In this he is warmly seconded by the eminent
draftsman of the Uniform Act.08 The same attitude, that the
filing once it occurs operates as constructive notice, is to be found
embedded in a number of decisions, both as to delayed original
filing 8 9 and as to renewal refiling after expiration of the initial
record by lapse of time. 90
Again, where the issue is as to the equivalence of actual notice
within the filing period, in place of the prescribed recording, as notice retrospectively cutting off intervening claims, the commentators
are united behind the proposition that it should be received as a
full and ample substitute.' 91 It is true that, with one exception,'92
engrossed in sketching the parallel, they overlook the fact that the
hostile claim has already attached and that the actual notice will
thus operate in a different manner than ordinarily it does, but all
stress the propriety of treating it the same as compliance with the
statutory technique for giving constructive notice. The "notice
argument", while used rather less by the courts in this connection
than in that discussed in the preceding paragraph, has been advanced in opinions from West Virginia 93 and South Carolina' 94
Still, the authorities are not all one way. Dealing with belated
filings, whether original 95 or renewal, 9 6 and with the giving of
actual notice in lieu of timely filing, 7 decisions are to be found
187 Ibid.
288 BoGERT,

loo. cit. supra n. 159. The same substantive position is taken by
the Commissioners' Note, quoted supra n. 136, doubtless for the reasons articulated by the draftsman, although that is not expressly spelled out in the Note.
189 See Castaneda v. National Cash Register Co., 43 Ariz. 119, 122, 29 P. (2d)
730, 731 (1934); Commercial Credit Co. v. Gaiser, 134 Kan. 552, 557, 7 P. (2d)
527, 530 (1932); Morey & Co. v. Schaad, 98 N. J. L. 799, 801, 121 Atl. 622, 623
(1923); accord, Holland v. Adams, 103 Ga. 610, 30 S. E. 432 (1898) (but stating that the contrary view would be taken except for the express terms of the
local statute).
190 See Collingswood Trust Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 112 N. T.
Eq. 597, 599, 164 Atl. 689, 690 (1933).
29, See (1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 714; (1934) 19 IowA L. REv. 475, 476;
(1934) 32 MiOH L. REv. 709, 710, all commenting adversely on Universal Credit
Co. v. Finn, 212 Wis. 601, 250 N. W. 391 (1933).
192 See (1934) 19 IowA L. REv. 475, 476.
193 See Banks-Miller Supply Co. v. Bank of Marlinton, 106 W. Va. 583, 587,
146 S. E. 521, 522 (1929).
194 See Talmadge v. Oliver, 14 S. C. 522, 527 (1881).
195 Cf. Air Equipment Corp. v. Rubbercraft Corp., 79 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A.
2d, 1935) ; Chilberg v. Smith, 174 Fed. 805, 98 C. C. A. 513 (C. C. A. 9th, 1909);
Bugbee v. Stevens, 53 Vt. 389 (1881).
'go Cf. American Laundry Machinery Co. v. Simon, 255 App. Div. 203, 6
N. Y. S. (2d) 943 (1938).
'97 Cf. In re Daney Hardware & Furniture Co., 198 Fed. 336 (N. D. Ala.
1912) aff'd imem. 201 Fed. 1023 (C. C. A. 5th, 1913).
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which reject the contention that the hostile claimant is bound to
know by reason of these deviant endeavors of the seller or is thereby
stripped of his status as a bona fide purchaser or creditor. Several
of these cases do not advance the argument beyond the assertion,
ita lex scipta est, the statute constrains us. 198 It must be confessed
that casual examination of the statutes does not always disclose the
imperatives by which the courts feel themselves shackled; even
though they did, if no- other considerations could be adduced in support of the result, it might well be subject to the reproach that it inviolved a barren "stickling for form", 19 "the performance of a
vain act.''200 In two cases, however, there is a more searching analysis of what is involved; while both of them happened to involve
tardy original filings, their contentions are equally applicable to
belated renewal filings and to the timely giving of other notice
otherwise than in the manner directed by statute. Both construe
the statute as demanding timely filing and permitting no alternatives, in order that there may be notice of the conditional sale;
but both re-enforce their interpretation of the statutory mandate
with an exposition of the considerations which might be supposed
to have induced its promulgation, in terms which are applicable
to all of the filing statutes.
In Bugbee v. Stevens, 20 1 the Vermont supreme court had to
meet the argument that the situation was the same as that involved
in connection with record title to real estate, where the fact rather
than the time of record was admitted to be controlling. In denying
the analogy, it entered into an elaborate examination of the validity
of the premise that the filing of transactions with respect to personalty were calculated to afford information as to the state of title with
respect to it, differentiating the real estate situation because of the
factor of immobility of the property as well as differences in the
characteristic structure of transactions affecting it, and emerging
with the conclusion that the extremely artificial character of the doctrine of constructive notice, from filing or recording conditional
198 See Chilberg v. Smith, 174 Fed. 805, 807, 98 C. C. A. 513 (C. 0. A. 9th,
1909); In re Dancy Hardware & Furniture Co., 198 Fed. 336 (N. D. Ala.

1912).
1'9 3 JONES, Zoo. cit. supra n. 186 (C"The contrary holding, to the effect that
the contract takes effect as to third parties from the date of recording, even
though a definite time be named in the statute, is more consonant with fair
dealing and savors less of archaic law where stickling for form often overrode

the2 plain demands of simple justice".)
00 See Banks-Miller Supply Co. v. Bank of Marlinton, 106 W. Va. 583, 587,
146 S. E. 521, 522 (1929)
201 53 Vt. 389 (1881).
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sales, which it was almost certain the parties would never really
know about, justified a confinement of the doctrine to instances of
strict satisfaction of the legislative directions. 0 2 'In reaching the
same conclusion over fifty years later, Judge Learned Hand put
his finger on the same weakness of the doctrine that deviant conduct
might take the place of filing at the time prescribed by the statute,
when he said in Air Equipment Corp. v. Rubbercraft Corp.:203
"It is of course true that the evil aimed at is the false
credit gained by the buyer's ostensible ownership, and the
remedy is no more than the opportunity for information which
filing gives.... But the situation is apparently treated less
realistically, perhaps because creditors do not look at the
records anyway, and because the notice imputed to them is a
fiction. If the seller wishes to prevail after giving the buyer
a delusive credit, he is held to a strict conformity with all the
to give
requirements, even though
20 4 they do not in fact help
notice to the creditors."

In thus reaffirming what everyone knows, that constructive notice is not notice at all but is something the legislature conditionally
permits to be substituted for it, tfiese decisions get down to fundamentals. To say that there is constructive notice is only to say that
under the circumstances there is no need for notice. Every lawyer
is aware that only in very rare instances does a layman ever inspect
the records, with knowledge of the contents of which he is chargeable; indeed, conversation with highly intelligent members of the
general public reveals that for the most part they do not even realize
that there are public records to be examined ;2.yet, given due filing
202 The argument of the court, id. at 392-393, is too long for full quotation
at this point but deserves reading. The core of the argument seems to lie in
the following remarks: "No analogy exists between such records in regard
to furnishing constructive notice, and records of the title of real estate, nor
can the rules applicable to the latter be invoked in favor of the former. The
title to real estate passes by deed, will, levy of execution, or other instruments
in writing which are required to be recorded .... where all, interested in any
portion of the real estate.... can examine and ascertain its condition. Hence
it is reasonable to hold that such records are constructive notice of their contents to whomsoever may be interested therein or affected thereby. On the
other hand, the title to personal property passes by delivery of possession; and
no one would think of examining the town clerk's office to ascertain its ownership, excepting so far as the statute under consideration operates to render such
records serviceable to that end."
0. A. 2d, 1935).
203 79 F. (2d) 521 (C.
204 Id. at 523.
200 Except, of course, as to real estate transactions as to which there is general
public consciousness that the records are controlling. This phenomenon is noted
in the quotation from Bugbee v. Stevens, supra, n. 202, and constitutes a
significant difference in the way in which real estate and personalty transactions are in practise carried forward.
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or record pursuant to statute, such lack of knowledge makes no
difference, because the legislature has said that something else shall
take the place of information. So, those discussions0 0 which proceed on the assumption ,that actual and constructive notice are
merely variants of a common concept, notice, do not get at the
root of the matter. They are beguiled by n verbal, descriptive likeness into erecting a relation which does not exist. Nor does it help
to say. there is a duty to know what is a matter of record. That
is a mere rephrasing of the proposition that people are bound by
what they do not tknow; the extent of the duty is measured by the
extent of conclusiveness of the record. Another attempt at bringing constructive and actual 'notice within a common framework
has been made by alluding to the opportunity for knowledge which
the record affords, and to the fact that, if the person claimed to
be charged with notice had but looked, he would have seen. 07 This
overlooks the fact that constructive notice is not a function of the
opportunity to know. For example, where an instrument has been
duly deposited or filed with the proper official, errors or omissions
in entering or indexing it do not prevent its serving as constructive
notice to persons dealing with the goods, even though they are thereby utterly disabled from discovering it - a settled rule as to conditional sales contracts, 20 8 early adopted in West Virginia, 00 and
which has been announced and applied under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.21 0 Conversely, where the instrument is filed so
.that by actual search third persons could in fact learn of the
existence of the contract, it nevertheless does not operate as con211
structive notice where it is not in form what the statute requires.
This all adds up to a lack of essential interdependence of constructive notice and opportunity to know. No relation which will bear
scrutiny can be established between notice and constructive notice
except the relation of substitution whereby the latter, under appropriate circumstances, replaces and dispenses with the former.
200 See, e.g., (1934) 47 HAnv. L. REv. 714; (1934) 19 IowA L. REv. 477.
207 See, e.g., Morey & Co. v. Schaad, 98
. J.L. 799, '802, 121, AtI. 622, 623
(1923) ("... one searching the records must have been confronted with their
[the conditional contracts,] existence and contents, and so acquired the notice
contemplated by the statute") ; 3 JoNEs, op. cit. supra n.7, at 140.
208 Id. § 1066; 55 C. J.1258.
209 Wagon Co. v. Hutton, 53 W. Va. 154, 44 S. E. 135 (1903).
210 Teweles v. Clearance Holding Corp., 108 N. T. L. 167, 156 Atl. 447 (1931).
211 See 3 JONES, op. cit. supra n. 7, §§ 1062-1064; 55 C. J. 1262.
Learned
Hand, J., speaking for the court in Air Equipment Corp. v. Rubbereraft Corp.,
mpra n. 203, alluded to this doctrine, saying, at page 524, "it appears to us
that there is no difference between a bill of sale seasonably filed but not
acknowledged, and one acknowledged but not seasonably filed, so far as concerns creditors who sell or lend after filing").
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Since to say that third persons' claims will be rejected when
they have constructive notice thus means that they will be rejected
under certain conditions when they have had no notice, the relevant
inquiry is, Under what conditions? In the event of exact and
literal compliance with the statute, certainly, for so the legislature
has directed; but if that is excused and anything else is given
parallel operation, that is a matter of judicial grace to the seller
in extension of the statutory protection. Thus, conceding that
"if the party to be affected has actual notice, the very purpose of
recordation is served", it does not follow, when the hostile claimant
has acquired his interest without notice, that to exact the timely
filing of the contract in order to disestablish that interest is to "require of the seller the performance of a vain act" ;212 the vanity of
the act consists in the judicial unwillingness to require it. Advance
actual notice would have prevented innocent purchase; subsequent
notice only defeats it and acts as a substitute because the court
feels moved to enlarge the scope of protection against purchasers
without notice. The same is true if tardy filing is permitted to
serve the purpose of timely filing in dispensing with the need for
notice. No implication is intended that the courts act improperly
in making such additions to the legislative prescription, indeed it
is their proper and most useful business to act as creative agencies
in the development of legal rules and rights. They must, however,
face the fact that any the slightest departure from the statutory
formula is an addition made on their own responsibility to the conditions upon which a purchaser without notice will be defeated.
In ,electing between strict application of the statute and its
extension by construction, the potential hardships to third persons
and to the seller are to be compared. A hostile claimant who has
inspected the files and discovered the record, however tardy, can be
forgotten because he had actual notice when he acted and will lose
in all events. A claimant who might have discovered had he inspected is theoretically perhaps also open to reproach. To let him
prevail might be thought to impair the value of the recording
scheme by condoning neglect to utilize it. On the other hand, failure to resort to the files, even ignorance that they are there to be
examined, remain in stubborn fact, and the law, if it is to retain
respect and support, must ultimately conform itself to popular
habits and practices and cannot, save to a very minor degree.
force life to conform to it. And what of the claimant who cannot
212 See Banks-Miller Supply Co. v. Bank of Marlinton, 106 W. Va. 583, 587,
146 S. E. 521, 522 (1929).
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be expected to learn of the sale-who examines the record while
negotiating for a purchase which is consummated thereafter, the
conditional sales contract having been filed in the meantime?218
who takes his chattel mortgage before there is anything of record,
recording it promptly but not until after intermediate fling of the
contract ?21' who makes advances under an existing mortgage with
an after-acquired property clause ?215 who repairs a damaged automobile or buys a car removed into the filing district before the
seller has notice of the removal and necessarily before he has
fied?21 s What of the hostile claimant compelled to rely on others
over whose diligence he has no control, such as an attaching creditor
delivering his writ to the officer ?217 Of course, in all these cases, he
runs the risk of a timely proper filing; but that is a risk breated
by the legislature, for which the courts are not answerable. What
they must determine is whether they wisl to impose other and
further risks upon those who will not probably and maybe cannot
possibly have guarded against them. Over against this, what is the
possibility of hardship to the seller? The loss of his security would
often be a serious thing; but he has always the means to prevent
it. All he needs do is what the legislature has told him. 18 If he
merely complies with the terms of a clear and simple statute, his
security is safe beyond Impairment; and it is to make sure that he
can comply that the filing period has been introduced into the
Uniform Act. Furthermore, while the ranks of hostile claimants
are recruited from small fry whose infrequent dealings are not
calculated to teach them the means of self-defense, conditional sell215 cf. C. I. T. Corp. v. First National Bank of Winslow, 33 Ariz. 483, 266
Pac. 6 (1928). This difficulty is noted by the Vermont court in Bugbee v.
Stevens,
53 Vt. 389, 393 (1881).
4
21 Of.Manchest v. Long Island Finance Co., 11 N. J. Misc. 718, 168 Atl. 35
(1933).
215 This was the situation involved in the cases cited
-pra notes 25-28, inclusive.
216 Cf. Chei-y's, Inc. v. Sharpensteen, 33 Ariz. 342, 265 Pac. 90 (1928) (re-

pair); Bergsteiner v. Street-Overland Co., 30 Ga. App. 140, 117 S. E.268 (1923)
(purchase) ; Commercial Credit Co. v. Gaiser. 134 Kan. 552, 7 P. (2d) 527
(1932) (purchase); Arnold v. Wittie, 99 Okla. 136, 227 Pac. 132 (1924)
(mortgage); C. I. T. Corp. v. Jorgensen, 60 S. D. 7, 242 N. W. 594 (1932)
(repair).

217 Cf. Baker v. Hull, 250 N. Y. 484, 166 N. E. 175 (1929) ; Bent v. Weaver,
106 W. Va. 164, 145 S. E. 594 (1928).
218 No difficulties are to be apprehended from the seller's being induced to
refrain from filing seasonably by representations of one receiving actual adverse notice within the filing period, since in such a case it would seem that
the hoitile claimant would be estopped from setting up the omission, of. Thayer
Mercantile Co. v. First National Bank of Milltown, 98 N. J. L. 29, 119 Atl. 94
(1922) aff'd 98 N. J. L. 29, 121 Atl. 927 (1923).
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ers are typically concerns engaged regulajly in that type of transaction, which may reasonably be expectel to be familiar with its
involvements. In the light of all this, the logic of the orthodox
common law attitude toward avoidable consequences would seem
to call for placing the resultant loss on a seller who has not seen
fit to use the legislatively provided means for protecting his security.
Yet logic is only one element in the decision; there are others
perhaps more important. In Uniform Act states, for instance,
there is the over-riding policy of uniformity of decision which
should probably by now compel acceptance of tardy filing on a
parity with timely filing as constructive notice thereafter, whatever the intrinsic merits of that position - although, by the same
token, other states should weigh that line of decisions in considering proposals to adopt the Act and mighi well find in it a ground
for declining to do so, at least without amendments. A more
general consideration, indeed the basid consideration where there
is any leeway left the courts, is that, in holding the seller to or
absolving him from the requirement of timely filing, they are deciding between relative encouragement and relative discouragement
of a widely-used device for the distribution of chattels and the
extension of credit. Informed decision must rest upon reasoned
conclusions as to the merits of that device. Conflicting views as
to this are tenable; enlightment must be sought in acquaintance
with economic materials219 - more acquaintance than is possessed
by the writer who confesses himself unable to reach a conclusion.
To the lawyer, one may suggest this as a: relevant field for employment of the "Brandeis" brief. To the courts, one may emphasize
that what they are doing here, wittingly or not, is expressing a
choice between the spread or the restriction of a type of financing,
a choice which is apt to be -wiser the more consciously it is made
and articulated.
As for West Virginia, with the law already so far advanced
in supplanting legislative by judicial specification of the conditions
when a third person without notice must bow to the conditional
219 Illustrative of the type of materials available, see NATIONAL BUREAU OF
Eco omo RESEARCH BULLETIN 76-7, The Statistical Patternof Instalment Debt
(1939) ; id. BULLIN 79, THE VOLUME OF CONSUMEER INSTALMENT CREDIT, 1929-

38 (1940); SELIGMAN, TnE EcONOMICS OF INSTALMENT SELLING (1927). The
former two publications are representative of purely objective iaterials, the
third arrives at conclusions in favor of the device, on considerations which may
perhaps demand partial re-examination in the light of changed business and
economic conditions of the last decade, and typifies the conclusion-formulating
material.
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seller's title, one may venture the prediction that, on nearly all of
the issues suggested in this paper, decision will be for the seller;
though, of course, it still may be worthwhile to raise them in any
cases not foreclosed by actual adverse holdings, hoping that they
will be found distinguishable. As for courts elsewhere, we offer
them a wealth of authority, if they conclude upon reflection that
our West Virginia law is wise; if otherwise, we still serve for
them the function which Patrick Henry suggested that Caesar and
Charles II had for George III.
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